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PREFACE 
This study examines the role of Swnner Helles in the termination 
of the United States occupation of the Dominican Republic. The 
primary objective is to inquire into Welles' involvement with and 
mission to the Dominican Republic to determine his concept of United 
States Caribbean policy. In negotiating the termination of the 
Dominican occupation, \\Telles led the United States away from a policy 
of imperialism and toward a policy which stressed friendly cooperation 
with the Caribbean nations. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE 
The resignation of Sumner Welles as Under-Secretary of State on 
September 30, 1943, ended a diplomatic career that had contributed 
much to the realization of the goals of international good neighbor-
liness and Hestern Hemispheric solidarity. During the twenty years 
Welles was associated with the State Department of the United States, 
he struggled to remove the notion of imperialism and ndollar 
diplomacy" from United States relations Hith other nations. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's statement in his first inaugural address that 
in the field of foreign affairs the United States would adopt the 
attitude of a Good Neighbor is primarily attributable to Welles' 
influence. Roosevelt and Welles had discussed United States foreign 
policy and, in particular, hemispheric policy, on numerous occasions 
during the months preceding the inauguration, and some of Welles' 
ideas were expressed by Roosevelt in his first major address on 
f . 1 . 1 orelgn re atlons. Over the next ten years the men selected to fill 
the more important State Department posts sought to follow a Latin 
American policy based on the Good Neighbor philosophy. Roosevelt's 
choice for Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility over 
Latin American affairs was Sumner Welles. 
In the only scholarly work devoted to Sumner Welles and his role 
i.n the Good Neighbor Policy, the author states, "Sumner Welles, hard-
1 
working career diplomat, worked out and detailed the program of the 
Good Neighbor for Franklin Roosevelt." 2 Bryce Wood observes that 
2 
during the development of the Good Neighbor Policy, "Welles dominated 
the day-to-day decisions relating to Latin America .. 3 President 
Roosevelt was not the only person influenced by 11 • one of the 
wisest of American diplomats .... 114 T. Harry Williams, Richard N. 
Current and Frank Freidel conclude in their work, !2_ History E_f the 
United States, that former Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, 
who tried to establish a new policy of extending American good will 
toward Latin America, was decided1y influenced by Sumner Welles during 
his first few months in office. 5 The New York Times, in praising 
Welles' appointment as }.JTibassador to Cuba in 1933, commented that 
"Secretary Hughes never hesitated to employ Sumner Welles when dif-
ficult and responsible work was to be done." 6 Statements such as 
these indicate that a complete examination of United States policies 
toward Latin America during the 1920s and 1930s must take into 
acccunt the role of Sumner welles. 
Although Helles is acknmvledged as having played a major part in 
the development of the Good Neighbor Policy, few historians have 
examined his ideas concerning foreign policy or their development. 
This is especially interesting since autobiographies, biographies, 
and other studies discuss nearly all of the important men, including 
some \vorks on men who served in positions farther removed from the 
center of decision-making than was Welles, who served during the 
Roosevelt years. Welles did not write an autobiography, and his 
biography is yet to be written. That historians have paid little 
attention to Welles is partly attributable to the fact that Welles' 
3 
personal papers have not been released for study. In addition, 
I 
Welles did not attract much public attention as a diplomat or State 
Department official until after 1933. As a result, he was over-
shadowed by Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and the events that erupted into 
'1-Jorld War II. Historians who have inquired into American diplomatic 
history for the years between 1920 and 1943 generally give Welles 
only passing attention, choosing instead to identify presidents and 
secretaries of state with particular foreign policies and policy 
decisions. Perhaps this is as it should be, since presidents and 
secretaries of state do have the re5ponsibility and authority to make 
policy and render the major practical decisions in line with that 
policy. This practice, however, does not give credit to the lower 
level officials fer their day-to-day decisions that breathe life into 
the policy and decisions that others make. In Welles' case, he not 
only made real and tangible the Latin American policies of Presidents 
Harding and Roosevelt and Secretaries of State Hug~es and Hull, but 
he convinced these men that these were the policies that they should. 
have followed. 
The most readily available and authoritative source of informa-
tion relating to Helles' role in United States-Latin American 
relations are the appropriate volumes of The Papers Relating ~ the 
Foreign Relations~ the United States. 7 In this essentially official 
record of American foreign relations, the student finds the final 
versions of signed treaties as well as many of the letters, telegrams, 
and memoranda that were sent and received by the State Department. 
The attitudes and ideas of individual diplomats, such as Welles, are 
evident in many of these documents; in Welles' case, however, these 
4 
volumes do not contain the complete record of his involvement. In 
order to examine fully Welles' influence on Latin American-United 
States relations, especially his role in terminating the United States 
occupation of the Dominican Republic, it is also necessary to review 
the letters and memoranda that were not published in the Foreign 
Relations volumes. These documents are among the public records 
preserved in the National Archives. Welles' speeches, delivered 
during his tenure as Assistant and later Under-Secretary of State, 
are also available for examination. Although Welles presented these 
speeches on behalf of the Roosevelt administration, they still reflect 
his own opinions and ideas. Welles had a reputation for being honest 
and direct, and in the area of inter-American relations his vie"lvs 
closely paralleled those of the administration he served. 8 
Welles was the author of six books. One can find the clearest 
statement of his philosophy and ideas in these works. Five of the 
books were written after 1942 and concern the war and post-war era. 9 
These vmrks do not constitute welles' memoirs; rather, he recalls the 
diplomatic decisions that W2re made and the effect of the policies 
that were adopted. Welles minimizes his own involvement in those 
decisions in which he played a part, except to respond occasionally 
to the criticism of others and to clarify his position where disputes 
occurred. Written as they were at the end of his State Department 
career, these five books are the end result of Welles' diplomatic 
experiences. Welles' first book, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican 
Republic 184·~-1924, a two-volume history of that Caribbean nation 
published in 1928, is an early statement of his conception of what a 
Good Neighbor Policy should entai1. 10 Naboth's Vineyard followed 
Welles' first major effort to end United States imperialism and re-
verse the policy of intervention. It also predates Welles' appoint-
ment as Ambassador to Cuba in 1933, the first major test of the Good 
Neighbor Policy. 
The concluding chapter of Naboth's Vineyard reveals that Welles 
had, by 1928, formulated the basic concepts of the Good Neighbor 
5 
Policy. A diplomatic biography of Welles covering the period betHeen 
1933 and 1943 states that VJelles " ... learned by his mistakes that 
the United States should not presume to dictate internal policies of 
independent American nations. 1111 If this was true of VJelles during 
the development of the Good Neighbor Policy, then the conclusions 
expressed in Naboth's Vineyard reveal what he learned from his ex-
periences in ending the United States occupation of the Dominican 
Republic. In writing Naboth' s Vineyard, VJelles did not detail his mvn 
important activities which helped restore the Dominican Republic's 
sovereignty. The most complete and accurate account of VJelles' role 
in ending the occupation of that nation is contained in the tnird 
chapter of Dana G. Munro's book;·The United States and the Caribbean 
Republics, 1921-33. 12 Hm·Jever, Munro, who was a contemporary of 
Welles in the State Department in the early 1920s, did not make Welles 
the subject of his chapter; rather, he provided an in-depth look at 
the issues and problems with which Welles had dealt. 
The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that Welles' 
involvement with and mission to the Dominican Republic from 1920-25 
were important to the development of his ideas on United States-Latin 
American relations. Welles' official mission to the Dominican 
Republic provided him an opportunity to accomplish a specific personal 
objective and to initiate a new concept in foreign policy. His 
attitude and methods reflected his concept of what United States 
foreign policy should be and how it should be carried out. It seems 
likely that Welles' experience in the Dominican Republic may have 
altered or at least refined his thinking in regard to the policy he 
believed the United States should adopt and follow. 
6 
Before discussing Welles' role in ending American military 
intervention in the Dominican Republic, it would be of value to trace 
briefly his career up to 1922. Sumner Helles, a member of a prominent 
New York family, was born on October 14, 1892. He was named for his 
great-uncle, Senator Charles Sumner of Hassachusetts, and he seemed 
to inherit the distinguished senator's interest Jn foreign affairs. 
Like his childhood acquaintance, Franklin Roosevelt, Helles attended 
Groton School and Harvard University, graduating from the latter in 
1914 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. He joined the Department of 
State in July, 1915, and received a secretarial post in the Tokyo 
embassy. Franklin Roosevelt, who at that time was Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, aided his entry into the State Department. 
Welles spent t~vo years in Tokyo; his efficient and precise work 
favorably impressed his superiors. In August, 1917, his desire for 
an assignment in Latin America was realized when he assumed the post 
of second secretary at the embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 
this position Helles perfected his fluency in the Spanish language 
and became acquainted with the Latin American view of political 
affairs. Hhile in Buenos Aires Welles' ideas concerning inter-
national good neighborliness and Hestern Hemispheric solidarity began 
to germinate. His work was so outstanding that he ~vas transferred to 
7 
Washington in May, 1920, and was named Assistant Chief of the Division 
of Latin American Affairs. Within three months he became acting chief 
of the division, and in August, 1921, he was appointed to head the 
division. For personal reasons Welles resigned from the State Depart-
ment on March 15, 1922. Four months later, however, an opportunity 
arose which permitted Welles to resume his uiplomatic career and 
continue, in a more direct way, to advance his ideas on Caribbean 
policy and diplomacy. 1 3 
When Charles Evans Hughes became Secretary of State in 1921, he 
allowed Welles to play a larger role in the development and conduct 
of United States-Latin American relations. In 1922, Welles was 
Hughes' trained technician at the Conference on Central American 
Affairs, which added substance to the principles of arbitration of 
disputes and non-intervention. In 1923, when a defeated presidential 
candidate in Honduras resorted to revolution, the United States re-
solved to abide by these principles. The United States immediately 
sent \varships to the honduran coasts and landed marines. In addition, 
Welles was dispatched to mediate the dispute along with delegates of 
the other four Central American states. As a result of Welles' 
efforts, a solution was reached \vhich did not impair Honduran 
independence or sovereignty. No United States military intervention 
occurred, and no United States financial protectorate was established. 
Follm.,;ring these tvlO successes and the withdrawal of United States 
troops from the Dominican Republic in 1924, Welles replied to one 
critic of United States Caribbean policy. Samuel Guy Inman had 
charged in an article which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly that the 
United States continued to foster a program of economic imperialism 
8 
and isolation of Europe from the Caribbean. The results of this 
I 
policy were, according to Inman, damaged friendships and suspicion. 14 
In his reply, Welles stated he was not convinced that more than a 
small proportion of the inhabitants of any one of the Latin American 
nations shared this viewpoint and that the day of dollar diplomacy 
in Central America was past. 15 Welles opined that the record of 
United States dealings with the Latin America republics 
. . . revealed a consistent effort on our part to strengthen 
the foundations of constitutional government, to develop 
legitimate commercial relations, and, by demonstration and 
friendly advice, to further the settlement by peaceful 
methods of international disputes.l6 
From his review of the relations of the United States vlith 
several of the Latin American nations, Welles concluded that during 
the period from 1912 to 1922, the United States had been sincere and 
unselfish in its desire to promote understanding and remove discord 
and at all times had used its influence on the side of right and 
justice. 17 In comparing Inman's and Helles' vie>vpoints, it is 
apparent that >vhere Inman saw the United States engaging in imperialism, 
Welles did not. Welles des~ribed the practical task ton£ronting the 
United States in its dealings with the Latin American nations in 
these words: 
Our relations with all the neighboring republics should be 
those existing between free and independent nations; yet, 
until certain of these countries have developed a firm 
tradition of orderly, constitutional government, the United 
States must be prepared to step in to protect the lives and 
property of its citizens should they at any time be in 
danger; and it must like\vise be ready to assume the 
responsibility of offering its friendly mediation, or, in 
extreme cases, its friendly intervention, should conditions 
be such as to threaten •.• the Monroe Doctrine 18 
In addition, Helles considered that the United States was justified in 
tailoring its dealings with various Latin American republics because 
9 
of 11 • , • geographic proximity, treaty relations, and other 
reasons . ul9 Helles recognized positive common aspects in 
United States relations with all of its southern neighbors, but he 
was also aware that errors and abuses had occurred in its relations 
. h . d' "d 1 . 20 Wlt 1n 1v1 ua nat1ons. 
The error which Vlelles especially decried \vas the United States 
military occupation of the Dominican Republic. He believed that the 
United States did not have the same right of intervention as he 
believed existed with regard to Cuba. He opined that President 
Wilson would not have authorized the occupation had he been cognizant 
of the events \vhich prompted the decision. 21 For an appreciation of 
Welles' viewpoint and in order to set the stage for Welles' role in 
correcting the error, it is appropriate to examine United States-
Caribbean relations in general from 1900 to 1920 and to consider in 
some detail United States-Dominican relations during the same period, 
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CHAPTER II 
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1900-1920 
American involvement in the Caribbean increased rapidly during 
the years just prior to the turn of the century, and the United 
States developed a foreign policy that took into consideration the 
economic, strategic, and political importance of the area. The 
foundation of this policy was the Monroe Doctrine; the importance 
and significance of the Monroe Doctrine became more apparent as 
American interest in an isthmian interoceanic canal grew because of 
its economic and strategic value. 
The United States \van ted to expand its commercial ties with the 
Caribbean and Latin American Republics. It was due to trade considera-
tions that the United States initially believed it had a vested 
interest in the construction and operation of a canal. In addition 
to the economic benefits that were expected from the venture, military 
leaders such as Admiral Alfred T. Nahan measured the canal's import-
ance in strategic terms. Mahan arzued that the defense of the United 
States required a large, two-ocean navy; for this navy to fight at 
maximum strength in either ocean, an isthmian canal was necessary. 1 
The sound reasoning of Mahan's argument was proven during the course 
of the Spanish-American War. Immediately following the Spanish-
American \.Jar the United States, for both strategic and commercial 
12 
13 
reasons, focused its attention on securing the right to construct and 
operate a canal across the isthmus. The signing of the second Hay-
Pauncefote treaty in November, 1901, finally removed the diplomatic 
roadblocks. This treaty gave the United States the right to construct, 
regulate, and manage an isthmian canal and to fortify it against 
foreign attack. As a result of the 11big stick11 diplomacy of President 
Theodore Roosevelt, the new Republic of Panama became the site for the 
all important interocean waterway, which was opened to traffic in 
August, 1914. 
The decision to construct and operate an isthmian canal based on 
economic and strategic considerations also required that the United 
States provide for its protection. The adequate defense of the Panama 
Canal necessitated United States control over the Caribbean approaches. 
Thus, at the same time the United States pursued its canal objP.ctives, 
it also sought to establish United States hegemony in the Caribbean. 
The acquisition of Puerto Rico at the end of the Spanish-American War 
provided the United States its first territorial foothold. In 1903, 
the United States acquired virtually complete control over the Bay of 
Guantanamo in Cuba and began construction of a major naval base there. 
Over a decade later the United States purchased the Virgin Islands 
to prevent their falling into German hands during World War I. These 
territorial acquisitions, although vital to the defense of the canal, 
did not eliminate all the threats to the canal's safety. The 
possibility of foreign intervention loomed large because of the chronic 
political instability and financial irresponsibility that existed in 
most of the Caribbean republics. 
One major objective of American foreign policy in the Caribbean 
14 
was to provide stability and order. The United States believed that 
I 
by forcing political stability and economic order upon the Caribbean 
republics it could eliminate the major threat to the Honroe Doc trine 
as well as improve its O\vn commercial relations. In pursuit of this 
objective, the United States intervened on several occasions in the 
internal affairs of her Caribbean neighbors. On one hand, these 
interventions produced the desired results by preventing European 
intervention in the Caribbean republics. On the other hand, American 
intervention largely failed to establish political stability and 
financial order. American efforts tm-1ard this end merely increased 
anti-American feelings throughout Latin America. 
The United States employed various forms of intervention in its 
dealings with the Caribbean republics between 1900 and 1920. Prior 
to 1913 and the presidency of Woodrm;r Wilson, the United States had 
routinely extended recognition to~ facto governments when they had 
demonstrated control of the nation and a capability for honoring their 
international obligations. Wilson introduced a policy of de jure 
recognition. Under this doctrine of legitimacy the United States made 
recognition of a government contingent upon the acceptance of certain 
conditions, often some form of American financial controls. Latin 
Americans regarded de jure recognition as a form of intervention in 
the domestic affairs of a nation and protested its use. In 1930, the 
Hexican Foreign Hinister, Genaro Estrada, reiterated Latin American 
objections to de jure recognition in what is no\v called the Estrada 
Doctrine. This Doctrine calls for immediate and unconditional 
recognition of any government, regardless of how it comes to power, 
and would abolish recognition as an instrument of policy. Since 1930 
15 
the United States has come to accept a less extreme version of the 
Estrada Doctrine. Before 1930, however, the United States extracted 
concessions from several Caribbean governments in an effort to help 
resolve their political and economic problems. 2 
The United States also employed other means of influencing 
Caribbean governments. The fate of governments in power or the out-
come of revolutionary efforts 'vere effectively controlled through 
application of arms embargoes. In Cuba, Haiti, Panama, Nicaragua, 
and the Dominican Republic, constabularies trained and commanded by 
Americans replaced the national armies. In Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic the constabularies were converted into instruments 
for the rise to power of later dictators. Since much of the political 
instability in the Caribbean nations was due to the prevalence of 
corrupt election practices, the United States directed the drafting 
of new electoral codes and in some cases supervised elections. 3 
Fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the Caribbean governments 
posed a real threat to the United States goal of hegemony in the area. 
Starting with Vene~uela in 1902, the major European nations initiated 
strong demands for settlement of outstanding claims. A near perpetual 
state of civil war in Venezuela bad proved ruinous to foreign 
investors and the unscrupulous and corrupt dictator, Cipriano Castro, 
showed no inclination to submit the debt claims to arbitration. As a 
result, and with the tacit approval of the United States, Germany and 
Great Britian instituted a naval blockade of Venezuela in December, 
1902. The blockading nations, which soon included Italy, seized 
several Venezuelan gunboats and sank two. Castro subsequently agreed 
to arbitration and the claims were finally settled by the Permanent 
16 
Court of Arbitration at the Hague in 1904. 4 
The issue of the collection of debts was of deep concern to the 
Latin American nations at the turn of the century. In the midst of 
the Venezuelan crisis, Luis Marfa Drago, Argentine minister of foreign 
affairs, suggested to Secretary of State John Hay that the use of 
armed force to collect debts was unjustified. The proposal, to become 
known as the Drago Doctrine, specifically addressed armed intervention 
by a European power. The forced collection of debts, reasoned Drago, 
was virtually synonymous with territorial occupation which was con-
trary to the principles of the Honroe Doctrine. Therefore, there was 
no obstacle to bar United States acceptance of the doctrine's 
principles. 5 
President Theodore Roosevelt recognized that the forced collection 
of debts by European governments, if left unchecked, posed a threat 
to the Honroe Doctrine. Although Germany, Great Britian, and Italy 
were careful not to challenge the Honroe Doctrine directly during the 
Venezuelan crisis, there was fear that this would eventually happen. 
In settling the Venezuelan claims, the Hague Court declared that the 
powers that had attacked that nation had a prior claim on payment of 
their debts. By 1909 the Dominican Republic had a foreign debt of 
about $22,000,000 and was unable to pay its bills. France, Italy, and 
Germany threatened to intervene to recoup their money. 6 
Faced with the prospect of European intervention in the Caribbean, 
Roosevelt, in his annual message to Congress of December 6, 1909, out-
lined what has since become known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" of the 
Honroe Doctrine. The Roosevelt Corollary reflected the Drago 
Doctrine's opposition to European armed intervention in Latin America, 
17 
but it did not rule out debt-collecting efforts by the United States . 
. 
Rather, this essentially new policy established the United States as 
the bill collector in the Caribbean. This action prevented European 
governments from exercising their right to force payment of outstand-
ing claims and, thereby, kept the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine 
• 7 1ntac t. 
Having cast itself in this ne•v role, but reluctant to resort to 
armed intervention, the United States sought to impose financial con-
trols on the debtor Caribbean nations. In the Dominican Republic in 
early 1905, and later in other Caribbean countries, the United States 
established receiverships. The purpose of the receiverships was to 
insure honesty in the collection of revenues and to prevent diversion 
of the revenues collected from their proper destinations. In all 
cases, the United States receiverships assured service on foreign 
debts. Although customs receiverships eased the threat of European 
intervention, they did not stabilize the internal political strife 
that resulted from poor budget planning and internal fiscal administra-
tion. Thus, the United States moved to extend its control by appoint-
ing financial advisors to oversee budgeting and tax collecting. 
Finally, the United States sought to limit the indebtedness and 
expenditures of the Caribbean republics. 8 
In addition to establishing financial controls to achieve 
political and economic stability in the Caribbean and, thereby, 
contribute to the defense of the Panama Canal, the United States 
government supported the extending of loans by American lending 
institutions to the financially troubled republics. The purpose of 
this policy was to make additional loans from European sources 
18 
unnecessary and to assist the Caribbean republics in strengthening 
and expanding their economies. The American bank loans also served 
as a lever which the United States used to force the acceptance of 
financial controls. The extending of loans, predicated on acceptance 
of financial controls, appeared to many as a design to protect the 
investments of American bankers, who would then realize a profit. 
This led to the charge of American "dollar diplomacy11 • 
As stated previously, Sumner Welles devoted his career to 
reversing the legacy of ill will that American intervention in the 
Caribbean had produced. Welles' first opportunity to affect the 
changes he desired in American foreign policy carne \vhen he -v1as appointed 
Commissioner to the Dominican Republic in 1922. Welles' actions dur-
ing this assignment were to some extent shaped by the course of events 
that had transpired there during the previous tHo dec2des. In order 
to understand Welles' role in the termination of the United States 
occupation of the Dominican Republic, it is irnport2nt to be familiar 
Hith the problems besetting the Republic between 1900 and 1920 and the 
record of American intervention there. 
With his election as President of the Dominican Republic on 
October 20, 1900, Juan Isidro Jime'nez fell heir to the unpaid debts 
of his dictatorial predecessor, Ulises Heureaux. The French govern-
ment quickly demanded that Jimenez make immediate payment on French 
claims; it was expected that other foreign governments and investors 
would make similar requests. Despite instructions to the contrary, 
the American minister successfully secured prompt payment of a dis-
puted American claim. 
The American minister's actions increased the anti-American feel-
19 
ing that had developed during the last years of the Heureaux govern-
ment, and there developed new pressures to have the Dominican govern-
ment cancel the concessions of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, 
A . f. . 1 9 an mer1can 1nanc1a concern. In 1892, the Improvement Company had 
purchased the interests of Westendorp and Company, a Dutch firm, which 
• 
previously had obtained limited control over the Dominican custom 
houses as security for loans to the Heureaux government. The terms of 
the purchase agreement transferred control over the Dominican custom 
houses to the Improvement Company. Once the Improvement Company 
established its claim to Dominican customs revenues, it made two new 
/ 10 loans totalling $11, 000,000 to the Jimenez government. 
President Jimenez joined in the criticism of the Improvement 
Company and claimed that the Improvement Company, because it had failed 
to render payments on the French debt as required, was responsible for 
the recent difficulties \vith the French government. The Dominican 
government tried to negotiate an end to the Improvement Company's 
involvement in Dominican financial affairs, but the final agreement, 
approved by the Dominican Congress on April 18, 1900, actually 
prolonged the life of the Improvement Company. Under the terms of the 
new pact the Improvement Company received almost complete control 
over the collection of customs revenues. It would apply forty-three 
per cent of the customs receipts to the retirement of foreign held 
bonds, provided ·the·, foreign bondholders agreed to accept payments 
made by the Improvement Company. The Improvement Company proceeded to 
collect the customs revenues, but the foreign bondholders, particularly 
·the Belgians, repudiated the arrangement and refused to accept payments 
made by the Improvement Company. Jimenez's attempt to secure payment 
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of his nation's debts through the Improvement Company failed; indeed, 
he was strongly criticized for having approved the terms of the agree-
ment in the first place. The foreign bondholders looked to their 
respective governments for assistance, and the Dominican government 
once again faced the problem of dealing with the European bondholders 
11 
separately. 
Following a public announcement that the Dominican government 
was bankrupt, on January 10, 1901, Jim~nez cancelled the Improvement 
Company's authority to collect public revenues. The Improvement 
Company, which by its actions had earned the hatred of the Dominican 
people, appealed to the United States government for assistance. The 
State Department, however, refused to intervene officially. 
Unofficially, the State Department urged the Improvement Company to 
negotiate the sale of its interests to the Dominican government. 
Discussions bet\·!een the officials of the Improvement Company and the 
Jim{nez government did result in a proposal whereby the Dominican 
government would purchase the Improverr:ent Company's interests, but 
there was \videspread public and congressional opposition to the 
offer. Sporadic revolts against the Jim~1ez government erupted but 
were suppressed by Vice-President Horacia Vasquez. Vasquez, though 
privately opposed to his government's purc.hase of the disputed 
interests, chose initially to back the administration since he 
expected Jimenez to support him for the presidency in the next 
1 . 12 e ect1on. 
By the time the proposed agreement calling for the purchase of 
the Improvement Company's interests was submitted for ratification in 
September, 1901, relations between Jimenez and Vasquez had become 
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seriously strained. vt.squez's supporters, the horacistas, dominated 
the congress and refused to ratify the proposal. Dominican congres-
sional action began the final round of events that ultimately led to 
an open break bet\Veen Jime"nez and va"squez in April, 1902. FolloHing 
the rejection of the purchase proposal, on Harch 17, 1902, the 
Dominican Congress censured Jime'nez for exceeding his constitutional 
h . d . 1 d f. . 13 aut or1ty an creat1ng a arge treasury e 1c1t. This action 
forced Vice-President Va"squez to clarify his position. / Vasquez \vas 
caught bet\Veen his desire to save the government he had helped 
establish, and of Hhich he Has a member, and his desire for the 
presidency. v{squez initially encouraged Jimcinez to alter his poli-
cies. Jim~nez not only refused to folloH Vasquez's counsel but also 
determined to eliminate his chief opponent by armed force. On 
/ April 26, 1902, Vasquez proclaimed a revolution, routed the govern-
ment army Hithin six days, and secured the President's resignation. 14 
Assuming the post of Provisional President, V{squez launched a 
reform program that included a neH effort to terminate the involvement 
of the Improvement Company in Dominican affairs. Vasquez quickly 
reached an agreement Hith company officials that set the value of the 
Improvement Company's interests at $4,500,000. The negotiations, 
hoHever, floundered on the questions concerning the number and amount 
of installment payments and the nature of the security that would be 
offered the Improvement Company for the payments due. The meetings 
were reopened Hith the assistance of the United States, Hhich had 
recognized va'squez Is government in July' 1902. Finally, after a six 
month stalemate, both sides agreed to submit the remaining questions 
to an arbitration commission and to abide by the arbitral aHard. The 
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Dominican government and the Irwrovement Company signed an accord on 
January 31, 1903, 15 but the arbitral commission did not meet until 
December of that year. 
" Even before Vasquez agreed to arbitrate the details of the pur-
chase of the Improvement Company, opponents of his government had 
initiated armed revolts. The suppression of these insurrections was 
an added burden on the already seriously depleted Dominican National 
Treasury. The uprisings became so serious that Vfsquez took personal 
command of his troops in the field, and his frequent absences from 
the capital permitted his opposition there to conspire more freely. 
In April, 1903, the supporters of former President Heureaux, led by 
General Alejandro Woss y Gil, seized control and forced vfsquez to 
flee to Cuba. 16 
Foreign creditors immediately pressured the new government, 
headed by General Woss y Gil, for payment of outstanding claims. The 
threat of armed intervention by a European nation became real when 
Germany forced an upward revision of its claim by dispatching a Har-
ship to Santo Domingo. 16 Official recognition of the claims of 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United States was all Woss y 
Gil could do to forestall intervention, since all sources of national 
revenue had already been pledged, and the National Treasury was empty. 
These financial difficulties, coupled with the administration's Heak 
political position, precipitated another revolution, which ousted 
Woss y Gil from the presidency in November, 1903. 
General Carlos Morales, the recognized leader of the latest 
revolution, had a tenuous hold on the government at first, but he 
gradually secured the support of the horacistas and some disenchanted 
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followers of Jime'nez. In order to strengthen his political position 
and to prevent the seizure of Dominican custom houses by European 
powers, a situation that seemed inevitable, Horales moved to curry 
favor with the United States. In December, 1903, the arbitral com-
mission met to decide the remaining issues regarding the purchase of 
the Improvement Company's interests. The particulars of the settle-
ment, signed on January 31, 190Lf, reflected in tone the stated 
intention of Morales to negotiate a treaty with the United States that 
would make the Dominican Republic a protectorate and permit the 
U . d S d . . D . . f" 1 ff . ll n1te tates to a m1n1ster om1n1can 1sca a a1rs. Commencing 
in September, 1904, the Dominican Republic would make monthly payments 
to the Improvement Company. Should a payment fall in arrears, an 
American appointed financial agent would take control of the customs 
houses at Puerta Plata and, should the revenues from this action prove 
insufficient, assume control of the custom houses at Montecristy, 
Sanana, and Sanchez. The Dominican government defaulted on the first 
payment due the Improvement Company, and, with the blessing of 
Morales, an American financial agent took control of the custom houses 
at Puerta Plata,l8 
The favoritism given American claims to Dominican customs 
revenues distressed the European governments, >vhich informed the 
Dominican government that they would not long permit their claims to 
customs revenues to be ignored. At this juncture, on December 6, 1909, 
President Roosevelt announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.l9 
Welles, in his work Naboth's Vineyard, emphasizes that Roosevelt's 
pronouncement was merely a response to Morales' desire relative to the 
establishment of a protectorate. 20 It appears that Welles did not 
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conceive the corollary as an extension of any right of intervention. 
Rather, the settlement signed in January, 1904, provided for the 
eventual establishment of an American receivership. Welles was not 
the only student of United States-Dominican relations who stressed 
the significance of the arrangements providing for the purchase of 
the Improvement Company. Melvin M. Knight, in his book published 
in 1928, offers the opinion that the United States, in the terms of 
the agreement signed in January, 1904, " .. deliberately paved the 
way to a .•. . h' .,21 rece1vers 1p . . . . In Knight's view, United 
States intentions were obvious before Roosevelt cast the nation in 
the role of an international policeman. Regardless of >vhether the 
terr~ providing for the sale of the Improvement Company, or the 
Roosevelt corollary, paved the 1vay for the establishment of an 
American receivership, there is little doubt that the prospect of 
European intervention was the major concern of both the United States 
and the Dominican Republic. 
Perceiving the serious threat of intervention by a European 
nation, particularly Germany, President Theodore Roosevelt indicated 
to Morales that he 1vould respond favorably to a formal suggestion 
that the United States take charge of collecting all Dominican 
custoiTs revenues and apply a percentage of the receipts to the retire-
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ment of foreign claims against the Dominican government. Morales 
suggested such an arrangement, and a protocol to this effect >vas 
ratified on January 31, 1905. A slightly revised version of the 
protocol was subsequently submitted to a special session of the United 
. St t S t F b 15 ·f · f · · 23 a es ena e on e ruary or rat1 1cat1on. ~wing to the re-
luctance of the Senate to take immediate action on the measure, 
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Presidents Roosevelt and Morales were forced to employ temporary 
arrangements that would accomplish the objectives of the protocol but 
which would not require senatorial approva1. 24 By means of an 
executive agreement, customs collections were placed under the charge 
of an American receiver, who would deliver forty-five per cent of the 
total receipts to the Dominican government and hold the remainder on 
deposit pending the ratification of the protocol by the United States 
Senate. 25 
This semi-official receivership remained in effect for two years 
and was generally approved by the parties concerned. It eliminated 
the danger of European intervention, an obvious threat to the Monroe 
Doctrine as interpreted by President Roosevelt, since the receiver-
ship assured Dominican creditOLS that their claims would be paid. 
Not only did the Dominican government receive a guaranteed percentage 
of the customs revenues collected, but the customs houses ceased to 
be a lucrative target for revolutionary groups. Dominican leaders so 
accepted the receivership that it was not even a major cause of the 
political turmoil that saw General Ram0:'1 ca'ceres replace Horales as 
President in 190s. 26 
Not everyone, hmvever, was happy with the receivership, and in 
1907 there were efforts to prevent its being made official. Critics 
in the United States Senate questioned the legality of President 
Roosevelt's actions in establishing a receivership. In the Dominican 
Republic, the general opposition of the followers of former President 
Juan Isidro Jjme'nez, knmro as the jimenistas, was in accord with 
their anti-American position. Dominican creditors with claims against 
the government protested certain provisions of the convention estab-
26 
lishing an official receivership. These Dominican creditors 
specifically opposed the reduction of their claims. 27 Nevertheless, 
the recognized success of the semi-official receivership coupled with 
the strong support of Presidents Roosevelt and ca'ceres resulted in 
ratification by both nations of the Convention of 1907, which placed 
Dominican customs under official United States receivership. 
Amicable relations between the two nations continued through the 
presidential terms of Roosevelt and cfceres. American business 
profited as a result of the receivership, 28 and the Dominican Republic 
received more revenue from its share of the customs receipts than it 
h d 1 . d . h bl' h f h . h. 29 a rea 1ze pr1or to t e esta 1s ment o t e rece1vers 1p. It 
appeared that the improved financial situation and the elimination of 
the threat of European intervention had stabilized the political situ-
ation in the Dominican Republic. A settled political atmosphere did 
prevail for nearly four years, but the assassination of cdceres in 
November, 1911, shattered the political harmony. ciceres' murder 
showed that while the receivership had eased the Dominican Republic's 
financial >voes, it had not cured its political ills. Describing the 
Dominican scene subsequent to the assassination, Sumner Welles wrote, 
11The entire country relapsed with incredible rapidity into a state of 
complete anarchy." 30 In a futile attempt to restore order, ciceres' 
incompetent successor, Eladio Victoria, reversed the gains made tm.;rard 
financial solvency, and in violation of the 1907 convention, increased 
the public debt by $1,500,000. 31 Coincidental with the altered 
Dominican situation was a changed attitude toward Latin America on the 
part of the United States under President William Howard Taft and 
Secretary of State Philander Knox. Commenting on the shift as it 
affected the Dominican Republic, Welles said: 
• 
In place of the courteous, helpful, considerate spirit mani-
fested . , , in accordance, , .. with the true interests 
of the Dominican people and without undertaking to inter-
vene in their internal affairs, there is now assumed by the 
State Department an attitude of omniscience in all that con-
cerned the solution of the domes tic problems of the Republic, 
A policy to still internal discord in the Dominican Republic 
was formulated, based solely upon the recomrr,endations of the 
agents of the United States government, , , This 
solution, once determined, was dictated.32 
27 
The anarchic situation in the Dominican Republic, which disrupted 
the efficient collection of customs revenues and threatened the sub-
stantial American business investments made during the relative 
r tranquil years of Caceres, provoked strong action by President Taft 
and Secretary Knox. On the recommendation of the American minister 
to the Dominican Republic, William W. Russell, that 11 .. only com-
plete control by our Government would permanently insure order and 
justice, 1133 in September, 1912, President Taft dispatched two comis-
sioners and a force of marines to the Dominican Republic to restore 
order and protect American interests. Threatening to suspend payment 
of the Dominican share of the customs revenues, the co~~issioners 
forced President Victoria to grant a number of concessions and finally 
to submit his resignation. This latter step was considered necessary 
to prevent the usurpation of authority by revolutionists opposed to 
the United States. The American government favored Archbishop Adolfo 
Alejandro Nouel as the most acceptable successor to President Victoria, 
and in December, 1912, he was elected to the presidency. 
The recent American actions, considered by many Dominicans as 
violations of their national sovereignty, prompted a reappraisal of 
the supposedly friendly relationship of the recent past. Because of 
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the increased anti-American feeling which followed the actions of the 
American commissioners, Archbishop Nouel wisely resisted American 
dictates. Any other course of action would probably have plunged the 
Dominican Republic into armed revolt against the United States pres-
ence. The Archbishop, however, vms unable to overcome the difficult-
ies of being a compromise president. Pressured to agree to the 
demands of first the horacistas and then the jimenistas, the Arch-
bishop satisfied neither party. In March, 1913, he resigned from 
office. 
President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan inherited the anarchic situation that Taft and Knox had helped 
to create but had failed to end. Wilson, observed Sumner Welles, 
pursued a Latin American policy similar in attitude to that pursued 
by President Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Elihu Root, but 
he failed to realize his goals because of his preoccupation with a 
troubled Europe. 34 Bryan, who became the chief formula tor of solu-
tions to the Dominican problem, was " incapable of understanding 
the abstract intellectual idealism of [his] chief -- or of carrying 
it into practice."35 
In his first important decision pertaining to the Dominican 
Republic, Secretary Bryan erred. He chose to support fully the new 
Provisional President, Jose Bordas Valdez. Bordas was not well liked 
in his native country, and there was evidence that he was attempting 
to guarantee his own election as constitutional president. To fill 
the post of American minister to the Dominican Republic, Bryan select-
ed James Mark Sullivan, "a deserving Democrat," 36 at a time when, 
remarked Welles: 
With the exception of Mexico, there was no post in Latin 
America where there was more urgently needed . . • an 
American Diplomatic Representative capacitated by experi-
ence, ability, knowledge of local conditions, and a just 
appreciation of the manner in which the true interests of 
the Dominican people might be identified with the interests 
of the American people, than in the Dominican Republic. 37 
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Sullivan met none of these criteria. He was a lawyer-politician who 
desired the appointment because the· salary would allow him to pay 
his personal debts. His financial dealings later led to an investi-
gation and, subsequently, his dismissal from the State Department. 
Sullivan initially attempted to mediate the dispute between the 
Bordas government and its critics. Unsuccessful in this, he proposed 
to Secretary Bryan that the United States supervise the upcoming 
. 1 1 . h . f . d 1 . d . 38 congresslona e ectlons to guarantee t elr alrness an va l lty. 
Secretary Bryan accepted the proposal, though it lacked legal sanction, 
and dispatched American observers despite the strong protests of 
President Bordas, who Has in a position to control the election. The 
American presence and the outcome of the elections combined to con-
fuse the Dominican political picture. The elections, approved by the 
American minister, produced a congress hostile to President Bordas, 
who continued to receive American support. The Dominican opponents of 
Bordas, interpreting the American supervision of the elections as an 
indication of American lack of confidence in Bordas, increased the 
level of armed insurrection against him. Sullivan's interference in 
Dominican judicial, financial, and political affairs increased that 
nation's resentment of the United States. 39 President Bordas, mindful 
that he needed American support, permitted these encroachments to 
occur. The net result of Sullivan's meddling in Dominican affairs was 
a revolution that ravaged the island and toppled the constitutional 
30 
government • 
By August, 1914, President \Jilson had become cognizant of the 
bungling efforts of Bryan and Sullivan and realized that the perpetua-
tion of disorder in the Dominican Republic would impair his efforts 
to prevent war in Europe. Thus, Hilson decided to act to solve the 
Dominican problem. Wilson appointed t\vo commissioners to present his 
own plan for settlement to the contending factions in the Dominican 
Republic. 
The plan called for the resignation of President Bordas, the 
selection of a provisional president agreeable to all potential 
presidential candidates, and new presidential and eongressional 
1 . d A . . . 40 e ectlons un er merlcan supervlslon. The significance of the pro-
posal lay not so much in these features, but in the provisions that 
expressed a continuation of the interventionist policy begun by 
Secretary Bryan. The United States reserved the right to appoint a 
provisional president of its own choosing and to prevent any change 
. h b h h . . 1 41 ln t e government y ot er t an constltutlona means. In effect, 
the United States would not tolerate any more revolutions in the 
Dominican Republic. Finally, Bryan advised the corr~issioners that 
42 the plan itself vJas not a subject for negotiation. 
/ On August 27, 1914, Dr. Ramon Baez was installed as provisional 
preside.nt. Revolutionary activity subsided, and Baez and the 
American commissioners quickly agreed to hold national elections under 
American supervision. The primary candidates in the ensuing elections 
were former presidents Horacio Va"squez and Juan Isidro Jimtnez. 
During the campaign, Jime'nez secured the support of General Desiderio 
Arias and Federico Vela"squez, who both possessed a significant follow-
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ing, by promj_sing them positions in his cabinet. Jime'nez won the 
election and was inaugurated on December 5, 1914. 
The first problem Jimdnez encountered involved the American 
financial receivership. In March, 1914, President Bordas and 
Secretary Bryan had reached agreement on the appointment of an 
American "financial expert" to oversee the collection and disburse-
ment of the revenues of the Dominican Republic. 43 The following June, 
Bordas, acting without the consent of his congress, appointed Charles 
M. Johnson to the post. Jimdnez, prior to his election, secretly 
agreed to continue the appointment of the financial expert and to 
obtain the approval of Johnson's appointment as "Comptroller of the 
Finances of the Dominican Republic", but the new congress refused to 
sanction the appointment. The new congress opposed any expansion of 
American control of the nation:s financial affairs. Dominicans con-
sidered the American demand that the appointment be sanctioned an 
illegal intervention in their domestic affairs. The United States 
d b f k f . . 1 . 44 reacte y re using to rna e any lnancla concesslons. Caught be-
tween the demands of the United States and Dominican congressional 
opposition to them, Jim~nez moved to satisfy his congress. 
Perhaps swayed by Dominican congressional sentiment favoring the 
impeachment of President Jime'nez should he yield to American demands, 
the United States responded affirmatively when Jime'nez requested the 
withdrawal of the financial expert. In a few months time the vague 
wording of the agreement granting Jim,nez's request created a con-
troversy over whether the United States, in removing the financial 
expert, agreed with the Dominican claim that the position lacked legal 
standing. 45 
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In addition to the problem of an appointed comptroller to oversee 
his nation's fiscal affairs, Jim~nez came to be faced with other 
United States demands during 1915. In June, 1915, Robert Lansing re-
placed Bryan as Secretary of State. Armed insurrections against 
Jime'nez during the spring and summer of 1915 produced a warning from 
Lansing that, if necessary, the United States would send troops to 
enforce order. Subsequent to this, the United States admonished the 
Dominican government for increasing the public debt to $7,000,000 with-
out the consent of the United States as required by the 1907 conven-
tion.46 On November 19, 1915, as a result of the growth of the public 
debt, a formal note to the Dominican government repeated a request for 
the appointment of an American financial advisor. In addition, a new 
series of armed revolts caused the United States to demand the forma-
tion of a constabulary. This constabulary, commanded by American 
appointees, Hould have control over all arms, ammunition, military 
supplies, and traffic. 47 By this time, however, anti-American feeling 
in the Dominican Republic had intensified as a result of American 
actions in Haiti. 
Between 1908 and 1915, Haiti suffered political and economic 
woes similar to those in the Dominican Republic, but to a greater de-
gree. In July, 1915, after months of tension, American marines landed 
and began a nineteen year period of occupation. As a protest against 
the United States armed intervention in Haiti, the Dominicans opted to 
maintain their own sovereignty, whatever the consequences. The 
Dominicans flatly rejected the new United States ultimatums. 
The Dominican's refusal of the United States requirements placed 
Jime'nez in a grave situation. The action eliminated any hope of 
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securing the funds necessary t9 combat the spread of armed revolt. 
At the same time, any move by Jim~nez toward compromise with the 
United States without the consent of his congress was an invitation 
t 1 t . 48 o open revo u 1on. 
Jim~nez's primary antagonist was Minister of War, General 
Desiderio Arias, who aspired to the presidency. Astutely rejecting 
an American offer of troops to restore order, Jim~nez set upon General 
Arias by arresting the Chief of the National Guard and the commander 
of the capital fortress. Arias promptly seized control of the capital 
fortress, from v7here he commanded the loyalty of the majority of the 
armed forces, On May 1, 1916, the Dominican Co:crgress impeached 
Jim~nez for violating the constitution and Arias assumed control of 
the government. Secretary Lansing, however, announced that the United 
States fully supported Jim{nez. On Hay 4, American troops landed in 
Santo Domingo, ostensibly to protect American lives. The United 
States was also prepared to assist Jim{nez in recapturing the capital 
had he requested aid. Ultimately refusing the offer of Arr,erican 
troops, Jime"nez resigned or! May· 7-.-49 
William W. Russell, earlier named by Lansing to replace Sullivan 
as the American minister, received full authority to take whatever 
action was necessary in the wake of Jim,nez's resignation. Russell, 
in collaboration with the commander of the American forces, demanded 
the surrender of General Arias. 1\vo days later American troops occupied 
Santo Domingo after General Arias and his army had abandoned the 
capital. With American control of the city established, Russell under-
took to prevent the Dominican Congress from electing a partisan of 
General Arias as provisional president. Russell successfully blocked 
the election of an Arias supporter, and by June the horacistas and 
Arias supporters in congress were deadlocked. Meanwhile, continued 
American occupation of the Dominican Republic induced the surrender 
of General Arias and an end to armed revolt. The United States 
announced its troops would remain in the Dominican Republic 
II 
. . . until all revolutionary movements have been stamped out and 
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until such reforms as deemed necessary to insure the future welfare 
of the country have been initiated and are in effective operation."50 
Russell believed that the deadlocked congress and the presence 
of American troops offered a favorable opportunity for the United 
States to repeat its demand for the appointment of a financial 
advisor and the creation of a constabulary. Hith these intentions in 
mind, he worked to secure the appointment of a provisional president 
who was amenable to the demands of the United States. He declared 
that a provisional president \vho did not agree to appoint a financial 
advisor and create a constabulary could not expect the support of the 
United States. 
OnJuly 26, the Dominican Congress disregarded Russell's demand 
that he approve the selection of a provisional president and elected 
Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carbajal to the post. Henriquez y Carbajal, 
at the time of his election, was residing in Cuba, and Russell had no 
opportunity to extract any promises from him regarding American 
demands. Furthermore, Henriquez y Carbajal had not been involved in 
Dominican politics for some twelve years, and Russell could not be 
completely certain of the new president's position in the dispute. 
The United States refused to recognize the ne~v provisional president 
until such time as he and the Dominican Congress accepted the proposals 
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of the United States. Henriquez y Carbajal refused the demands, and 
the United States responded by suspending payment of the funds due 
the Dominican government under the Convention of 1907. 51 
In light of the suspension of payments, Henriquez y Carbajal, 
with the support of his cabinet, '"as disposed to accept those American 
demands that the Dominican constitution '"auld permit and which did 
not infringe on Dominican sovereignty. Minister Russell and the State 
Department, on the other hand, rejected any compromise. The Dominican 
public's dislike for the United States was by now so intense that a 
rebellion, spurred by an increasing number of incidents provoked by 
American troops, was a real danger. 
Citing the imminent threat of revolution and economic collapse, 
the failure of the provisional government to agree to the establish-
ment of American financial control, and the refusal to create an 
American controlled constabulary, Secretary Lansing asked President 
Wilson for permission to place the Dominican Republic under American 
'1' 1 52 m1 1tary ru e. On 1-;-ovember 20, 1916, the United States issued a 
proclamation instituting American military occupation of the 
D . . R bl' 53 om1n1can epu 1c. Sumner Welles described the initial days fol-
lowing the proclamation in these words: 
The extraordinary anomaly was thus presented in a brief ten 
days of the creation of a Government of the Dominican 
Republic, headed by an officer of the American Navy, with a 
cabinet composed of officers of the United States Navy or 
Marine Corps, none of whom had any knowledge or experience 
of Dominican affairs or problems, and the great majority of 
whom could not even speak the language of the country.54 
Captain Harry S, Knapp, appointed as military governor, largely 
accomplished his initial objectives of pacification and disarmament 
in all but two of the more rebellious Dominican provinces. In his 
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pursuit of these and other objectives, Knapp had a relatively free 
hand. The fact that he possessed a conciliatory nature and simply 
carried out orders rather than formulate policy made his task some-
what easier. Knapp organized the controversial constabulary, though 
he experienced some difficulty in recruiting Dominican officers. He 
initiated studies to improve education and agriculture and began new 
public works projects. A Dominican claims commission, whose member·-
ship included some Dominicans, undertook the adjudication of claims 
against the Dominican government and reduced the outstanding debt by 
some $9,500,000. A new land court gave much needed clarification to 
disputed land titles. \\Telles recognized the accomplishments of the 
military government and concluded that: 
, there existed on the whole a spirit of tolerance 
tm.;rards the officials of the Hilitary Government and an 
evidence of a desire for cooperation on the part of many 
prominent Dominicans in bettering the material conditions 
of the Republic.SS 
This state of affairs changed Hhen Rear-Admiral Thomas Snowden 
replaced Knapp in early 1918. 
Admiral Snowden did not seek Dominican counsel but relied instead 
on the advice of his own uninformed subordinates. Because of the ~.;rar 
in Europe, the military government escaped the close scrutiny of 
either the State Department or the Department of the Navy. The 
Military Governor possessed nearly complete authority in all matters. 
He imposed rigid censorship and at one point suggested that the 
occupation continue "for ten or twenty years 11 • 56 
Improprieties such as these and the end of World War I focused 
increasing attention on the occupation. Latin American governments, 
writers, and organizations protested the continued American control. 
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In the United States, such men as Samuel Gompers of the American 
I 
Federation of Labor demanded the withdrawal of American troops. 57 
For these and other reasons a new chapter in the Dominican problem 
began to unfold when Bainbridge Colby replaced Lansing as Secretary 
of State on March 23, 1920, and when Sumner Helles was appointed 
Assistant Chief, Latin American Affairs Division, on June 3, 1920. 
The withdrawal of the United States from the Dominican Republic 
would occupy the majority of Welles' time and effort for the next 
four years. 
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CHAPI'ER II I 
THE SEARCH FOR A PLAN 
OF WITHDRAWAL 
It was both fortunate and unfortunate that it took the United 
States and the Dominican Republic four years to negotiate and carry 
out a mutually acceptable plan of withdrawal. It was fortunate in 
the sense that the Dominican governmental system and the Dominican 
people were afforded time to adjust to and become responsible for a 
more politically stable and developed republic. It was also for-
tunate in the sense that for the first time the United States 
achieved the objectives of its Caribbean policy. It was unfortunate 
in the sense that Dominican pride prevented the United States from 
restoring Dominican sovereignty more quickly. The long occupation 
perpetuated and strengthened the legacy of ill will felt by the 
Dominicans toward the United States. Both nations worked toward a 
common goal during the four years -- the rapid withdrawal of the 
American military occupation forces and the termination of the 
American military government. Why, then, since the two nations 
shared a common goal, did they not reach an agreement more rapidly? 
Could the unfortunate results of the four years of negotiations have 
been avoided? The answers to these questions, contained in the 
record of negotiations, must take into account each nation's 
respective interpretation of the common goal. 
41 
42 
The Dominicans, in general, applied a strict interpretation to 
the goal. They wanted the restoration of their national sovereignty 
along '1-li th their personal freedom and liberty. The Dominican 
attitude toward withdrawal is expressed in the popular slogan of the 
time - "Evacuation, pure and simple. 11 Dominican nationalism and 
Dominican bitterness toward the military government and occupation 
forces demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal. The prospect 
of political turmoil and financial desperation like that which existed 
prior to the occupation was either ignored or was considered more 
acceptable than continuation of American occupation for any length of 
time. Most influential Dominican leaders recognized that for 
practical reasons the restoration of Dominican sovereignty would re-
quire certain preparations and concessions; however, they, too, 
inclined toward a strict interpretation of the goal. They would only 
make those preparations and concessions which were absolutely 
essential if the desired end was to be reached at all. 
The United States took a more liberal interpretation of the goal. 
To the occupying nation the phrase "rapid withdravml" meant evacuation 
of the occupation forces and termination of the military government 
as soon as the objectives of American foreign policy Here achieved. 
These objectives included: a responsible Dominican government capable 
of maintaining stability and order; a professional, non-political 
constabulary to protect lives and property and to defend the govern-
ment against rebellions; an effective electoral system to facilitate 
the peaceful transfer of authority from one government to another; 
and finally, a sound financial system. In sun®ary, the United States 
did not intend to \vithdraw until conditions in the Dominican Republic 
43 
assured the security of the United States. 
The different interpretations of the common goal made it dif-
ficult for the two nations to compromise readily. The Dominicans 
insisted upon restoring and protecting their sovereignty, a~d the 
United States insisted upon meeting its foreign policy objectives. 
This was the major theme which existed throughout the four years 
of negotiations. 
The appointment of Sumner Welles as Commissioner to the 
Dominican Republic on July 1, 1922, divides the four-year period 
of negotiations into nearly equal halves. The two years preceding 
Welles' appointment are characterized by his efforts to orchestrate 
the negotiations from his State Department post in Hashington through 
the military governor in the Dominican Republic. Helles' direct 
involvement in the negotiations as the Commissioner to the Dominican 
Republic distinguishes the years 1922 to 1924. vJelles was both 
qualified and prepared to endeavor to end the occupation first 
from \.Jashington, and subsequently, through negotiations in the 
Dominican Republic. 
Welles had arrived in the State Department in Washington from 
a position as Second Secretary of the United States Embassy in 
Argentina. His performance at the embassy earned Welles good marks 
from the United States Ambassador and, upon his departure, this 
comment in La Nacidn, the largest Argentine newspaper: 
Mr. Welles has distinguished himself in carrying out his 
mission, for the tact and intelligence displayed in all 
his actions . . . . He had the faculty of uniting vith 
decorum and poise in the fulfillment of the important 
affairs in which he intervened, diplomatic qualities of 
the kind which appear to belong to the chanceries of 
the older European nations , , . ,1 
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Working from his office in Washington, Helles did not have the 
opportunity to develop a relationship with the Dominican people as 
he had with the Argentinians. Welles, however, immediately became 
involved in the quest to end the occupation. It was more than mere 
coincidence that he was appointed Assistant Chief of the Latin 
American Affairs Division just a few months before the United States 
announced on December 23, 1920, its intention to withdraw from the 
Dominican Republic. While documentary evidence of \\Telles' contribu-
tions toward settlement of the Dominican problem during the early 
months of his tenure in Washington is meager, the structure and 
organization of the State Department at that time provides some in-
dication of his influence. 
In 1920, under Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, the State 
Department was divided into separate divisions. Each division Has 
responsible for a specific geographical portion of the world from 
Hhich it derived its title, e.g., the Latin American Affairs 
Division. These geographical divisions formulated policy and 
drafted memoranda supporting that policy for the Secretary of State's 
consideration. Furthermore, the geographical divisions made the 
decisions as to what would be done within the outline of general 
policy. As Assistant Chief, Latin American Affairs Division, Welles 
was available to handle problems that demanded special attention. 
It appears significant that Secretary Colby did not decide that the 
United States should withdraw from the Dominican Republic until after 
Welles arrived in Washington. Also, as Hill be detailed later, a 
flurry of activity focusing on the Dominican occupation began on 
June 3, 1920, the date of Welles' appointment to the Latin American 
Aff . n· . . 2 a1rs lV1S1on. 
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In addition to Welles' apparent natural ability to relate to the 
people of Latin America and the State Department's structure and 
organization, there are two other factors which help explain Welles' 
intimate involvement with the Dominican Republic. The first factor 
concerns the role the Department of the Navy had come to play in 
United States foreign affairs. By 1920, the Department of the Navy 
was responsible for supervising American military governments in 
Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. In the Dominican 
Republic, as in other nations where American military governments were 
established, the American military governor was the primary United 
States minister to that nation 1 s government, of which he \vas also the 
chief executive. vJelles' in Naboth Is Vinevard, describes the State 
Department's relationship with the military government in the 
Dominican Republic in these words: 
The State Department ... had to all intents relinquished 
supervision of the policy of the Military Government be-
tween the years of 1917 and 1920, and had refrained from 
providing the public with any information regarding the 
course of developments in that country. 3 
Welles' presence in the State Department coincided with that depart-
ment's efforts to reassert its dominance and authority over Caribbean 
affairs, and, concomitantly, reduce the role of the Department of the 
Navy. During the first two years of negotiations, it proved 
impossible to coerce the military governor to support fully the State 
Department's position and policy. In order for the State Department 
to relegate the military governor to a lesser position, it was 
ultimately necessary to give a State Department official presidential 
authority to negotiate and conclude a plan of withdrawal. Welles 
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received the assignment and authority and he was instrumental in re-
asserting State Department control over foreign affairs. 
The second important factor that served to place Welles in the 
forefront of ending the unfortunate occupation was that he agreed 
with President Warren G. Harding's and Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes' criticism of the manner in which President Woodrow 
Wilson's administration had dealt with the Caribbean republics. 
Harding and Hughes intended to follow a new and different policy, 
and \.Jelles was a faithful ally. Welles' strongest indictment of 
l.Jilson for the Dominican incursion was written in 1944, when he 
stated that it was " ... most tragic that Wilson should have 
authorized the military occupation of ... the Dominican Republic" 
and termed the intervention "unjustifiable."4 He echoed Harding 
who had criticized T;!ilson in 1920 for " ... repeated acts of un-
warranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little Republics 
of the Western Hemisphere .• uS Harding's goal in United States-
Latin American relations was to establish a policy of cooperation. 
Commenting on this aim Welleswrote: 
Such cooperation did not imply continuous meddling in the 
internal affairs of the nearer Latin American Republics, 
it did not envisage dictation as to the form and constitu-
tion of their governments, not the attempt to control 
their legislature; nor could it ever have entailed, save 
as a temporary measure owing to the need of protecting 
foreign life and property, armed intervention, and, much 
less, military occupation.6 
Welles, like Hughes, agreed with Harding's goal of cooperation. 
Welles also was in accord with Hughes' interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine as a policy of self-defense. Hughes believed that under the 
limited principles of the Monroe Doctrine the United States could act 
to remove any threat posed by the presence of a non-American power in 
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the Caribbean, to relieve any threat to the Panama Canal, to protect 
insular possessions, to guarantee the rights of United States 
citizens and to carry out obligations assumed under treaties. A few 
months before the withdrawal of American forces from the Dominican 
Republic was complete, Hughes explained his Latin American policy in 
these words: 
We are aiming not to exploit, but to aid; not to subvert, but 
to help in laying the foundations for sound, stable, and in-
dependent government. Our interest does not lie in control-
ling foreign peoples; that '"auld be a policy of mischief and 
disaster. Our interest is in having prosperous, peaceful, 
and law-abiding neighbors, with whom we can cooperate to 
mutual advantage.7 
This was a re-statement of the goals of previous administrations, 
and it shows that Hughes, at that time, thought intervention accept-
able. Five years later, however, Hughes wrote that the ''policy of 
the United States is non-intervention."8 \\Telles, at least through 
the 1920s, also believed intervention might be necessary but, like 
Hughes, he viewed it as a defensive act under the principles of the 
Monroe Doctrine. In 1924, Helles expressed his view of United States-
Latin American relations in these words: 
.•• our relations with all the neighboring republics 
should be those existing between free and independent 
nations; yet, until certain of these countries have 
developed a firm tradition of orderly, constitutional 
government, the United States must be prepared to step 
in to protect the lives and property of its citizens 
should they at any time be in danger; and it must like-
wise be ready to assume the responsibility of offering 
its friendly mediation, or, in extreme cases, its 
friendly intervention, should conditions be such as to 
threaten a national or international conflagration which 
would give rise to a situation wherein the policy of 
self-protection of the United States, known as the Monroe 
Doctrine, might be endangerec1.9 
It is apparent from the above that \\Telles was the right man to bring 
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to fruition Harding's desire for military disengagement from the 
Dominican Republic. Welles possessed the diplomatic skills, and he 
agreed with the administration's Caribbean policy. He was also, as 
we shall see in the following paragraphs, responsible for raising 
the prospects for a settlement on which the Harding administration 
could capitalize. 
Prior to Welles' appointment as Assistant Chief, Latin American 
Affairs Division, little serious activity was unden..ray in the State 
Department to end the American occupation of the Dominican Republic. 
This situation quickly changed. On June 3, 1920, the same day of 
Welles' appointment, the State Department ordered the American lega-
tion in the Dominican Republic to hold a conference with the military 
governor regarding the formation of a commission composed of 
Dominican leaders to study laws pertaining to elections, education, 
and sanitation and to submit recmmnendations to the State Department. 10 
While waiting for a reply, the Division of Latin American Affairs 
drafted an outline of a plan for the withdrawal of American forces. 
The provisions of this plan were as follows: 
1. Appointment of a Commission of Dominicans to study 
fundamental changes in Dominican lmvs, starting 
with the electoral lmv. 
2. Promulgation of the new laws by the Military 
Governor. 
3. Convening of a Constitutional Convention to enact 
~onstitutional changes, to include the "Platt 
Amendment." 
4. Formation of a Dominican government. 
5. Negotiation of a Dominican-United States treaty 
regarding the collection and control of customs 
revenues. 11 
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This proposetl plan bears Welles' imprint in its emphasis on con-
stitutional procedures. The historian, Dana J. Munro, who worked 
with Welles in the Division of Latin American Affairs,starting in 
1921, observed that Welles vms " . inclined to . . . insist on 
constitutional procedures. 12 Looking forward to the forma-
tion of a government as provided for in the proposed plan, Welles 
requested that the solicitor for the State Department provide an 
opinion regarding the constitutional standing of the military govern-
ment upon the election of a Dominican congress. The solicitor's 
rather obvious opinion was that the military government would be 
II 
.. no less constitutional since the ... military government 
can scarcely be regarded as a constitutional executive of the 
Dominican Republic. "l3 
In the ensuing six months the Latin American Affairs Division 
accomplished little tmvard completing the details of the plan. There 
were cogent reasons for this lack of activity. The State Department 
was unsure as to how best to proceed with the vJithdrawal and spent 
this time searching for ideas. The State Department also was just 
beginning its efforts to replace the Department of the Navy as the 
focal point of United States-Dominican relations. The Department of 
the Navy, particularly the military government, although cognizant 
that the occupation eventually must end, believed that its mission 
would require at least ten years to complete and reported that island 
conditions and Dominican sentiment favored gradual withdrawa1. 14 
On the part of the Dominicans, one knowledgeable student of the 
occupation concluded that "Dominican opinion was not ready for action."15 
Inasmuch as the occupation was a political issue in the American 
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elections of 1920, many Dominicans considered it advantageous to 
delay definitive action pending inauguration of the new administration. 
Also influential was the Dominican political situation. Dominican 
politics remained largely the politics of personalismo (allegiance to 
the party leader) and no leader or party dared to get too involved 
until the political future was more defined. The only politician vlho 
was willing at this time to assume responsibility for forming a 
Dominican government was Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carbajal, 
Provisional President de jure, and ardent leader of the nationalist 
henriquez party. Henriquez y Carbajal and his American agent, Horace 
B. Knowles, insisted that he be restored as president. The State 
Department, hov7ever, spurned such suggestions. The American minister 
to the Dominican Republic, William H. Russell, wrote to the State 
Department in September, 1920, that "the greatest calamity that could 
befall this republic would be to deliver it into the hands of 
Henriquez's party."16 The State Department, at the urging of Welles, 
followed this advice. 
In summary, the last half of 1920 was a time during \vhich Welles 
and the State Department became aware of the problems associated with 
withdrawal and to some degree, aware of the attitudes of the involved 
parties. Enveloping the withdrawal question was the problem of 
insuring a firm foundation for political stability and fiscal respons-
ibility. .The State Department and many Dominicans believed that the 
benefits gained during the occupation would be lost if they did not 
carefully engineer the end of the American occupation. 
By December, 1920, the State Department apparently realized that 
it could not unilaterally prepare a detailed plan of evacuation. 
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Further progress depended upon establishment of a dialogue with 
Dominican leaders. In unofficial contacts, some Dominican leaders 
suggested a Dominican conunission be formed to lay the constitutional 
and legal groundwork for the building of a national Dominican govern-
ment. In order that the task proceed officially and in response to 
public criticism of the occupation, the State Department asked the 
military governor to issue a proclamation 11 • • • to inaugurate the 
simple process . . . of rapid withdrawal. nll The Hili tary Governor, 
Rear-Admiral Thomas Snowden, made the pronouncement on December 23, 
1920, and it embodied what became known as the 11Wilson Plan. 11 The 
provisions of this plan were: 
1. The appointment of a Dominican commission and an 
American technical advisor to formulate constitutional 
amendments and undertake a general revision of the 
laws of the country, to include drafting an election 
law. 
2. Approval of the commission recommendations by the 
American military government. 
3. Submission of the approved amendments and laws to a 
constitutional convention and the National Congress.l8 
A comparison of the Wilson Plan with the outline of the plan 
offered by the Division of Latin American Affairs reveals little 
significant difference. If anything the Wilson Plan was less detail-
ed than that originally suggested. It was not so much a plan of 
withdrawal as it was an announcement that the United States \vould 
withdraw i.ts forces once there existed a legal code and an electoral 
system which would provide for the political and economic stability of 
the island. The United States hoped that by working with and through 
an official commission of Dominican leaders, it could avoid charges 
of dictating a plan of withdrawal which did not reflect Dominican 
desires. The United States also anticipated that the Dominican 
people would pressure the commission appointees to perform their 
assigned tasks quickly and that there would be popular support for 
the commissioner's efforts. Achievement of United States Caribbean 
policy objectives in the Dominican Republic depended upon Dominican 
cooperation. Eighteen months would pass before such cooperation 
would support a chain of events leading to termination of the 
American occupation. 
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In general, critics conclude that the Wilson Plan was a failure. 
These conclusions rest on the assumption that the single purpose and 
objective of the plan was the restoration of a Dominican government 
and the withdrawal of American military forces. Certainly, this \vas 
the final objective of the United States. However, the wording 
and provisions of the Wilson Plan viewed in light of the realities 
of the times in which it was pronounced, suggest that the State 
Department had a more limited objective and more immediate purposes 
in mind. The Wilson Plan marked the official beginning of American 
efforts to wi thdrav1 from the Dominican Republic. The plan con-
tained no specific timetable, an obvious recognition of the fact 
that '~ecause of the occupation, feeling against the United States in 
Santo Domingo [had] been exceedingly bitter.''19 It would take time 
to overcome the bitterness and condition the Dominican people to a 
cooperative attitude. One aspect of this cooperative attitude would 
be important to the United States objective of ending the political 
turmoil which was partly responsible for the American intervention in 
the Dominican Republic. 
Throughout its national life to 1916, the Dominican Republic had 
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had nineteen constitutions and thirteen presidents. Only three presi-
dents completed their terms in office; the remainder either resigned 
or were killed or deposed. There were thirteen presidents between 
1899 and 1916, seven between 1911 and 1916. There was appreheEf;:i_on 
that too rapid a withdrawal would cause a restored Dominican govern-
ment to succumb to personal ambition, political corruption, and a 
20 
weak electoral system. Carl Kelsey, after visiting the island from 
July to October, 1921, to study the intervention, concluded that the 
". • . Wilson Plan . produced no other result than to start into 
activity the local politicians." 21 In retrospect, this was one of 
the purposes the State Department hoped the vJilson Plan would serve. 
Prior to the proclamation of December 23, 1920, Dominican leaders had 
refrained from any significant involvement in national politics. The 
Wilson Plan rejuvenated Dominican politics, albeit under the control 
of the Military Governor, Admiral Snmvden. 
The extent to which the Wilson Plan was successful depends upon 
one 1 s understanding of the objective of the proposal. In notifying 
the American minister of the contents of the Wilson Plan, the State 
Department said its publication stemmed from the de~ision that "the 
time has come to take certain steps preliminary to a change in our 
t . . . . h D . . R bl' " 22 presen posltlon Vls-a-vls t e omlnlcan epu lc. In terms of 
this limited objective the Wilson Plan was a success. 
Dominicans unanimously rejected the provisions contained in the 
Wilson Plan. Bitterness and resentment toward the occupation was 
immediately manifested in the nationalistic fervor which labelled as 
traitors any Dominican who agreed to serve on the commission which 
was to draft laws and constitutional amendments for the military 
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governor's consideration. The State Department had prepared a list 
of possible appointees to the commission in advance of the proclama-
tion. The persons listed, each a potential candidate for public 
office or an influential political spokesman, were reluctant to 
commit themselves. They feared public opinion and they expected the 
United States to attach yet unmentioned conditions to the eventual 
withdrawal. 
Commission membership posed a serious dilemma. The political 
party that could convey the image of having ended the occupation on 
Dominican terms would gain a great political advantage in subsequent 
elections. There was no way of judging whether political advantages 
would befall those leaders who served on the commission or to those 
who did not. No politician was prepared to yield any advantage to 
his adversaries and no party dominated in numbers or pmver. The 
commission was formed, but only with great difficulty and only after 
the initial public clamor had receded and the politics of the situa-
tion suggested that participation was advisable, 
In retrospect, it was unlikely that the commission would prove 
effective because of the factionalized nature of Dominican politics 
and the emerging struggle between the military governor and the 
State Department. In formulating the Wilson Plan, the State Depart-
ment did not consult with Admiral Snowden, the military governor, 
except in regard to the appointees to the commission. Under the 
proposal, Snowden would appoint the commission members and would 
subsequently evaluate the commission's work. ·It was only logical 
that Snowden, who had his own ideas about the best course of action, 
would seek to appoint a commission \vhich would produce acceptable 
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recommendations. Snowden sugger;ted changes in the list of possible 
appointees and, acting on his ovm, made overtures to persons he con-
sidered desirable. In response, the State Department asked the 
Secretary of the Navy to direct the military governor to refrain from 
making any changes in the list of possible appointees and to follow 
the instructions of the Department of the Navy. At the same time, 
William W. Russell, the American minister, was directed to confer with 
the military governor and, in essence, inform him that the State 
Department would determine the commission appointees. The Secretary 
of the Navy did instruct Snowden to follow directions, but he also 
reminded the Secretary of State that the military governor, in the 
eyes of the Dominicans, was the senior representative of the United 
States to the Dominican Republic. lle should not, therefore, appear 
to receive instructions from the American minister. The result of 
this conflict was State Department acquiescence, at least for a time, 
to the authority of the military governor and compromise 1.-1ith regard 
t . . . t t 23 o commlSSlon appoJ.n men s. 
Finally, the attitude of Russell and Snowden tm.,rard the commis-
sion was pessimistic. Russell doubted that the commission would 
accomplish anything effective because of the political squabbling 
that the pronouncement evoked. Snowden, a year earlier, had appointed 
a consulting board of four prominent Dominicans to make recommendations 
regarding.the future welfare of the Dominican people. The consulting 
board accomplished nothing because Snowden would not compromise or 
show consideration for Dominican aspirations. Thus, the two United 
States representatives most directly responsible for presenting and 
selling the \Vilson Plan were not totally committed to insuring its 
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success. 
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The dialogue opened by the Hilson Plan produced some clarifica-
tion of the major areas of disagreement between the United States and 
the Dominican Republic and a clearer picture of the views of the 
interested parties. The Harding administration benefitted from this 
and upon assuming the reins of government undertook to review the 
situation. In early April, 1921, Helles submitted to Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes a background statement in which he con-
cluded that the occupation created a harmful impression. Helles also 
pointed out, however, that financial investors wanted United States 
control to continue indefinitely and that the military government 
wanted t\l;renty to thirty years to complete its mission, which included 
education of the people for self-government. He further indicated 
that "educated Dominicans" preferred a gradual restoration of a 
Dominican government, recognized the need for a ne~V election law and 
a revised constitution, desired United States control over financial 
matters, and, at least for a while, wanted an American controlled 
constabulary. 25 
It is doubtful that Helles 1 "educated Dominicans" would have 
agreed publicly \vith his conclusion regarding the constabulary. The 
Dominicans persisted in their unalterable opposition to American 
troops remaining after formation of a Dominican government. Helles 1 
conclusions show that he supported application of the formula followed 
since 1906 by the United States for the establishment of stability in 
the Caribbean nations. This formula provided for the restoration of 
financial order and the organization of a responsible, non-partisan 
constabulary that would preserve internal order and safeguard constitu-
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26 tional political processes. By raising the issue of an American 
controlled constabulary, Welles acknO\vledged that American troops 
could not be used to insure stability under a Dominican government 
and acknowledged that the constabulary was not yet prepared to 
perform this function. 
Now more cognizant of the issues complicating the process of 
withdrawal that he was in December, 1920, Helles, on April 6, 1921, 
presented a new plan for Hughes' consideration. Welles was 
optimistic that this revised proposal would prove workable not only 
because of its content but also because President Harding and 
Secretary Hughes were publicly cowmitted to withdrawal and because 
of the appointment of Rear-Admiral Samuel S. Robinson as military 
governor. According to Helles, 11 1 t uas hoped he \-JOuld cooperate more 
effectively \vith the Department of State in matters precedent to 
evacuation of United States forces. 1127 Helles' detailed plan took 
the following form: 
1. The appointed commission would draft an election law 
and revisions to the constitution and submit them to 
the military governor for approval. 
2. Following promulgation of the election law, an 
election of electors >..rho thereafter would chose 
members to a senate and chamber of deputies. 
3. Convening of the Congress to propose constitutional 
amendments and convocation of a constitutional con-
vention to ratify the amendments. 
4. Necessary law making pursuant to the new constitution. 
5. Organization of a provisional government to oversee 
the reorganization of local governments. 
6. Presidential elections and transfer of executive 
power to the elected president. 
7. Negotiation and ratification of revisions to the 
Treaty of 1907 to provide for the payment of out-
standing obligations and inclusion of United States 
authority to assure the maintenance of a government 
adequate for protection of life, liberty, and 
property. 
8. Maintenance of United States troops in the republic 
to insure life, liberty, and property pending com-
pleted training of the constabulary.28 
Welles' suggestions were not totally new; they outlined the same 
sequence of events Welles gave to William W. Russell, the American 
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minister, on January 8, 1921, for his use in persuading selected 
Dominicans to serve on the commission. 29 Evidently, Welles believed 
that by holding to this explanation of the Wilson Plan, Dominican 
leaders would eventually recognize the folly of insisting on a 11 pure 
and simple" evacuation and accept the proposal. 
During the next two months, both Admiral Robinson and Henriquez 
y Carbajal submitted ideas for consideration by the State Department. 
Welles rejected outright Robinson's proposal because it contained no 
provision for a revised constitution and code of laws, no assurance 
for financial responsibility, and no means for the maintenance of 
law and order after termination of the military government. The only 
advantage it did offer, according to Helles, was "rapid withdrmvaL 11 30 
Henriquez y Carbajal, who's reign as the last elected provisional 
president was cut short by the American occupation, magnanimously 
offered to resign in favor of an executive commission. Welles 1 cor-1-
tinued distrust of Henriquez y Carbajal and the fact that the 
provisional president's term of office had already expired, prompted 
quick disposal of the offer.31 
Despite the fact that Welles was disinclined to deal with the 
former provisional president, he recognized that Henriquez y Carbajal 
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wielded considerable influence over the more nationalistic political 
• 
groups. These nationalistas encouraged Dominican non-cooperation and 
for this reason Welles and Hughes discussed the most recent proposals 
Hi th Henriquez y Carbajal to secure his support. Henriquez y Carbajal, 
realizing the United States was not going to restore his provisional 
presidency, indicated that the plan was acceptable. 32 His support was 
short-lived, however, because subsequent events made it impossible for 
him to use the plan to return himself to the presidency. 
By early June, 1921, Welles had obtained President Harding's and 
Secretary of State Hughes' approval to have the new plan announced to 
the Dominican people. Welles coordinated the necessary instructions 
with the Department of the Navy, and on June 14, 1921, the military 
governor issued a proclamation containing the revised plan of with-
dra\val. This new offe:r-, known as the "Harding Plan", officially re-
placed the Wilson Plan. The Harding Plan seemed reasonable. Deleted 
from Welles' April proposal were provisions for United States inter-
vention to protect life, liberty, and property and for American 
control of Dominican expenditures. Added to the plan was a provision 
that the Dominican Congress ratify a treaty of evacuation calling for: 
1. Ratification of all acts of the military government. 
2. Validation of a final loan to finance the completion 
of necessary public works projects. 
3. Extension of the duties of the General Receiver of 
Dominican Customs to apply the above loan and assure 
service of the republic's foreign debt from internal 
revenues. 
4. A United States ~ilitary mission to complete the 
training of a constabulary; said constabulary to be 
under authority of the executive of the Dominican 
Republic,33 
The treaty provision requiring the ratification,of all acts of the 
• 
military government eliminated the need for the commission to com-
plete a reform of the basic laws prior to the elections; hence, the 
commission was dissolved. Tije military governor, as the chief 
executive of the republic, was empowered to set the election 
machinery into motion. The State Department anticipated completion 
of the entire process within eight man ths; hmvever, several factors 
combined to make this an overly optimistic projection. 
Welles either expected the Dominican people to recognize the 
true intent of the Harding Plan or was prepared to rely on Robinson 
and Russell to explain the plan and its intent to the Dominicans. 
The State Department erred on both counts. Welles explained the 
intent of the steps contained in the plan as follows: 
It is the desire of the Government of the United States 
to assure itself before its withdrm;ral is accomplished 
that the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Dominican Republic, the maintenance of public order, and 
the security of life and property, will be adequately 
safeguarded •... 34 
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This was a clear enough statement from a State Department vie1-1point, 
but not from a Dominican vie1vpoint. Helles would blame the plan's 
ultimate demise partly on the Dominicans' inability to see its real 
intent because of their inclination "to believe that some hidden 
danger, some threat to their independence, .•• lurk[ed] in every 
phrase of the plan • • u35 Welles had tried to allay these fears 
through publication in leading Dominican nevJspapers of the terms of 
the plan and official explanation of their true intent. He sent 
explicit instructions to help Robinson and Russell clarify United 
States intentions during direct negotiations with Dominican leaders. 
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Russell, however, was limited in his effectiveness because of his 
subservient position to the military governor and because of his 
connection with events since 1916. Robinson, whom Welles 
characterized as ''unfitted .•• by any previous training" 36 for the 
task of diplomatic negotiation, proved inflexible in his conversation 
with Dominican leaders. Robinson 1 s "diplomacy'' reinforced Welles' 
opinion that competent, professional diplomats were vital to carrying 
f . 1" 37 out ore1gn po 1cy. 
Political realities also contributed to the Harding Plan's mis-
fortune. Political parties and potential candidates in the Dominican 
Republic continued to jockey for a favorable position in the 
inevitable elections. There was some fear that Henriquez y Carbajal 
could ride a nationalista wave to the presidency if the plan was 
accepted and if he could assume responsibility for the United States 
withdrawal. The remaining candidates were undoubtedly aware that 
United States support would be important to the elected president, 
but the appearance of cooperating with the United States to obtain 
election could have evoked charges· of treason and political ruin at 
the hands of the unsuccessful parties. Personalismo was still a 
powerful force in Dominican party politics, and no one was willing 
to form any type of formal coalition. 
Dominican attitudes and politics and American diplomatic 
ineptitude were the underlying reasons for Dominican repudiation of 
the Harding Plan. Overtly, the Dominicans attacked the plan's pro-
visions as a continued infringement on the sovereignty of their small 
island nation. The political leaders refused to participate in 
elections conducted by the military government, and there were 
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objections to the proposed treaty provisions calling for ratification 
of all acts of the military government, extension of the powers of 
the General-Receiver of Dominican Customs to include internal 
revenues, and the requirement for an American military mission to 
train and partly command the constabulary. 
According to Welles, ratification of the acts of the military 
. 1 . d . ll h . . t . 1138 government was essent~a to avo~ creat~ng a c aot~c s~ uat~on. 
Undoubtedly, Welles had in the back of his mind the State Department 
solicitor's opinion that the military government had no legal stand-
ing. However, the military government, acting for the republic, had 
issued decrees amounting to law, entered into contracts, obtained 
loans, and paid claims. As a result, many individuals and businesses, 
Dominican and foreign, had acquired rights to funds and property. 
Failure to recognize these rights would produce conditions worse than 
those which had existed in 1916. Unfortunately, the plan called for 
"ratification of all acts of the Military Government." 39 There was 
no clarification in the plan of what the phrase 11all acts" meant. 
The Dominicans interpreted this provision as a requirement that 
they assent to all past acts of the military government, good or bad, 
and agree to continue existing dictates which they considered 
infringements of their personal liberty and rights. By mid-1921, 
the military government had instituted strict gun control and press 
censorship, and had tried Dominicans in American military courts for 
purely political offenses. In addition, the proposed extension of the 
authority of the General-Receiver to internal revenues was considered 
a device to guarantee foreign interests at the expense of Dominican 
prosperity. 
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Welles, by means of official proclamations to the Dominican 
people and instructions to Military Governor Robinson and Minister 
Russell, attempted to clarify these two provisions. Welles explained 
that while all the acts of the military government should be 
initially ratified, and thus, made law, a Dominican government, once 
formed, could repeal or revise any of the laws, except laws relating 
to financial obligations. The extension of the authority of the 
general-receiver to internal revenues Welles described as essential 
to protecting the rights of individuals and businesses vlhich had 
entered into contracts and extended loans. Further, internal revenues 
would only be attached if depressed customs revenues posed a threat 
to the satisfaction of debts. Along with his explanation of these 
t>vo provisions, Welles emphasized that the actual terms of the treaty, 
which a Dominican government would be asked to ratify, were proper 
subjects for negotiation.40 
Admiral Robinson, after meeting with Dominican political leaders 
twice to detail the proposals, believed that the explanations had 
produced the desired effect and that the election process would soon 
begin. He was overly optimistic, however. The Dominican poli_tical 
leaders, in the face of public pressure and the partisan political 
activities of Henriquez y Carbajal, declined to participate in the 
elections. In addition, the Dominican political leaders were 
reluctant to decide their political destiny on the basis of explana-
tions which inferred reliance on the good faith of the United States. 
The most intense opposition focused on the proposed treaty pro-
-vision which would permit an American military mission to train and 
supplement command of a national constabulary. Few Dominicans could 
------ --- ---- ---
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accept the provision as anything other than a trick to continue the 
military occupation. The plan contained no definite statement as to 
the duration of the military mission or the authority of American 
military officers. Also, the question of who Hould hold American 
officers accountable for their actions was raised. There were no 
specific replies that Welles could make regarding the duration of the 
mission and authority of its members. The anS1:vers lay in the question 
of how much time was needed to find and train Dominican officers for 
the constabulary. The training and organization of an efficient, 
apolitical constabulary was one of the main objectives of the military 
occupation. Dominican attitude toward the American controlled 
constabulary, the drain on American military manpower incurred by 
World \\far I, the decline in revenues, and the neglect of officer 
training, hovJever, produced a constabulary that was ill-prepared to 
protect a new Dominican government. The most pressing need was for 
officers, but few qualified Dominicans applied. The American 
military government founded the Haina Hilitary Academy in August, 
1921, but more than a year elGpsed before its products contributed to 
resolving the shortage of trained officers. As to the holding of 
American military officers accountable for their transgressions, 
Admiral Robinson suggested the American military justice system as a 
viable means of punishing offenders. 41 
The refusal of the Dominicans to cooperate in the Harding Plan 
did not persuade the State Department to withdraw the proposal. 
Rather, Admiral Robinson was instructed to issue a proclamation stat-
ing that since all aspects of the plan had been fully and carefully 
considered, there was no reason to make any changes. Therefore, the 
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elections provided for in the Harding Plan were postponed. The word-
ing of the proclamation, which was announced on July 27, 1921, placed 
responsibility for the postponement squarely on the Dominican refusal 
to participate in the elections. 42 
There was some hope that this latest proclamation would shock 
Dominicans into cooperating. Horace Knowles, an agent of Henriquez y 
Carbajal, provides evidence of this intent in a letter dated July 25, 
1921, to Under-Secretary of State Henry P. Fletcher. In the letter, 
Knowles attributes to ~·Jelles words to the effect that " . . if the 
Dominican Congress did not accept the plan proposed by the State 
Department, measures would be taken to compel it to do so. ,.43 
In addition, on July 30, 1921, Helles advised Secretary Hughes that 
it was " ... not too soon to consider what form of assistance and 
guidance we should endeavor to give the Dominicans. In this 
message to Secretary Hughes, Helles may have planted the seed \vhich 
resulted in his appointment as Special Commissioner to the Dominican 
Repub lie. In urging appointment of a financial advisor, 1-Jelles 
described Dominicans as follows: 
The Dominicans, \vhile strongly nationalistic and possessed 
of a different attitude toward government than in general 
in the United States, are susceptible of persuasion by 
persons of strong personality and great intelligence, 
especially foreigners, assuming that they know the Dominicans. 45 
Such an American, however, was not present in the Dominican Republic 
in 1921 and Dominican politicians were not shocked into cooperating. 
The stalemate lasted for several months. In Santo Domingo, 
Robinson made a weak attempt to persuade Dominican leaders to accept 
the plan. He urged on the State Department, and adopted himself, a 
policy of patient adherence to the Harding Plan as the surest means 
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of reaching an agreement. There was some merit :In this approach; the 
military government subsequently reported that the main political 
parties had begun organizing their forces for eventual elections and 
believed that the United States sincerely intended to withdraw. 46 In 
Washington Welles at various times conferred \vith Henriquez y Carbajal. 
Little, if anything, resulted from these conversations, but they did 
keep Welles and the State Department informed of the status of 
nationalista thought. Welles Has careful not to give the former 
provisional president any encouragement to consider himself the spokes-
man f 11 D . . 1 . . 1 . 4 7 or a om1n1can po 1t1ca part1es. 
Welles, by now Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, 
was fully informed of all developments relating to disoccupation. In 
a letter dated October, 1921, the Latin American Affairs Division out-
lined its assessment of the situation to Secretary Hughes. It 
concluded that time and an explanation of the proposals had secured 
understanding of, and agreement with, all provisions of the plan 
except the military mission. The deadlocked situation was attribut-
able to Dominican political leaders' maneuvering for a favorable 
position and their related unwillingness " .•• to assume responsibil-
48 ity of agreeing to proposals of this government." Also included in 
the letter were policy suggestions which took into consideration the 
unlikely resolution of the problem through conferences between the 
military government and Dominican political leaders and the probable 
conclusions of a Senate Select Committee investigation of the 
occupations of both the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The Latin 
American Affairs Division suggested that the American minister or some 
other government official reaffirm to Dominican political leaders the 
intention of the United States,to withdraw in accordance with the 
Harding Plan and reemphasize that withdrawal could not occur unless 
an elected Dominican government was established. The Dominican 
political leaders' refusal to participate in the elections would 
leave two courses open to the United States: (1) proceed with the 
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elections and hope the Dominican people would overrule the objections 
of their political leaders, and (2) announce continuation of the 
occupation because of a lack of cooperation by the Dominican people. 
The effect of these policy suggestions and the replacement of the 
military governor as the primary United States negotiating official 
eventually produced a plan of withdrawal acceptable to both nations. 49 
Welles asked Senator Medill NcCormick, Chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee, to deliver the reaffirmation message to the 
Dominican political leaders. Senator McCormick was a wise choice, in-
asmuch as the Dominicans perceived that the committee might agree 
with their demand for immediate, unconditional withdrawal. The 
committee, however, was inclined to support the State Department's 
policy of adherence to the Harding Plan. To avoid giving support to 
the nationalista cause and endangering the negotiations for withdrawal, 
the committee opted to withhold any recommendations on the Dominican 
occupation pending the outcome of the State Department's policy. 
Senator McCormick's conveying of the State Department's message was 
both an overt statement of committee support for the policy being 
followed and a statement of nonsupport for the nationalista cause. 50 
In December, 1921, Senator HcCormick reiterated in a letter to 
Secretary Hughes, the conclusions which Helles had reached the 
previous October. He offered the opinion that no political leader was 
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willing to assume responsibility for governing the Dominican Republic 
during the existing economic depression and suggested that efforts be 
made to relieve the financial problems. 51 
By the end of 1921, the post-war economic depression was effecting 
the finances of the American military government. The public works 
program, important to improving the economic and educational levels of 
the Dominican people, was funded on the basis of available monetary 
reserves and anticipated income. Prior to 1920, both of these revenue 
sources had grown steadily. In 1921, however, the military government, 
faced with declining revenues, reduced the. government payroll and 
suspended work on all but the most important public works projects. 
The training of the constabulary also suffered from reduced funding. 
By the end of 1921, the military government desperately needed finan-
cial aid, but several factors made the State Department reluctant to 
consent to a ne~.; loan. In 1918 and in 1921, the military government 
had obtained loans through the sale of bonds, secured by customs 
revenues, at in.terest rates up to 18.9 per cent. Retirement of these 
bonds was scheduled to coincide with the retirement of the bonds 
issued under the Treaty of 1907 and the termination of the customs 
receivership established under that treaty. Both of these loans 
placed a heavy burden on the dwindling customs revenues. The 
Dominican leaders opposed any new loans; the State Department agreed 
because it would extend the life of the customs receivership. Re-
solving the financial woes of the island thus became linked to the 
policy of patient adherence to the Harding Plan and the course of 
action the State Department had adopted the previous October. 52 
In January, 1922, Helles reiterated to Secretary Hughes the 
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suggestions of October, 1921, which had been designed to force the 
• 
Dominican political leaders into participating in elections conducted 
by the military government or bear the responsibility for continua-
tion of the occupation. Welles also commented on the pressing need 
for financial relief for the military government. He accepted the 
Hili tary Governor 1 s opinion that ". . . with a good working balance 
in the treasury, strong sentiment against retention ... of a 
1 . 1 " 53 d d mi itary mission might poss1b y be overcome, an recommen ed 
provision for a new loan. Hughes and Harding approved the suggestions 
and on February 19, 1922, Admiral Robinson and Minister Russell 
arrived in Washington to receive their instructions. 54 
The recall of Robinson and Russell for consultations \vas part of 
the course of action adopted earlier. Their instructions amounted to 
a strong restatement of Senator HcCormick's message reaffirming the 
Harding Plan. They \vere ordered to inform the leaders of the various 
political parties and other influential Dominicans that the United 
States \vas unwilling to allow the deadlock to continue and that the 
Harding Plan would be >vithdrawn unless they immediately agreed to call 
for elections and urge their followers to participate. If this 
ultimatum was rejectedy the occupation would continue until the most 
urgent public \vorks were completed and an adequate Dominican constab-
ulary was functioning. Robinson and Russell were to tell the 
Dominicans that the supervisors of the elections " might well be 
Dominican citizens recommended for such position by the Dominican 
political leaders" and not necessarily officials of the military 
government or of the American occupation forces. In addition, as a 
11 final concession", the United States would omit the requi.rement for 
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a military mission with the understanding that a legation guard of 
I 
American marines would be maintained until both governments agreed 
that the Dominican constabulary was capable of maintaining public 
order. Finally, to alleviate the financial difficulties, the military 
government would be authorized to obtain a new $10 million loan 
secured by Dominican customs receipts. Although this loan would ex-
tend the life of the customs receivership, this was unavoidable since 
it was unlikely a Dominican government could obtain a loan without 
h . 55 sue an extens1on. 
Robinson and Russell delivered their instructions at a meeting in 
the Archbishop's palace on February 23, 1922. In his report of the 
meeting to Secretary Hughes, Russell stated, "It would seem that all 
of those attending the conference carne with their minds made up to 
accept nothing."56 Robinson reported that the conferees refused to 
cooperate unless the United States dropped the military legation as a 
d . . 57 con 1t1on. On the afternoon of February 23, 1922, despite being 
asked to consider the matter for a few days, the Dominican conferees 
flatly rejected the latest proposal in writing. 58 Subsequently, on 
March 6, 1922, Admiral Robinson issued a proclamation prepared by 
Welles the previous January, formally withdrawing the Harding Plan. 
The proclamation announced the negotiation of a loar\ allowing for the 
continuation of the occupation pending completion of the program of 
public works and public education and the organization and training 
of the constabulary. Upon comple_tion of these projects the United 
States would consider ,;r:i_thdra~·al following the election of a properly 
constituted Dominican government and ratification of the extension of 
the duties of the General Receiver.59 
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This latest plan of action stirred a few Dominican leaders into 
action. In December, 1921, the State Department had received "strong 
indications" that at least two Dominican political parties, the 
Partido Progresista, or the velasquistas, as the followers of 
Federico Vel~squez were called, and the Partido Nacional, led by 
General Horacia va'squez and commonly referred to as the horacistas, 
ld . . f 60 wou JOln orces. In late March, 1922, Russell reported that 
I Velasquez had stated that when Dominican finances were in order and 
the constabulary was of sufficient strength, he and General v{squez 
would submit a proposal for holding elections. 61 Robinson also re-
ported increased cooperation among the various political parties and 
suggested waiting for an offer of settlement from a combination of 
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responsible Dominican leaders. In addition, Dr. Francisco J. 
Peynado, formerly the Dominican Minister to the United States and an 
eminent lawyer \vho had remained politically non-aligned, arrived in 
Hashington in roid-Harch to attempt to arrange for a program of with-
dra1val. Peynado had been a participant in nearly all of the con-
ferences bet\Veen the military governors and Dominican leaders since 
1919 and had conferred with Helles in Hashington prior to pronounce-
ment of the Wilson Plan in December, 1920. In their later uritings, 
Helles and Dana G. Munro, who replaced 1-Jelles as Chief of the La tin 
American Affairs Division, both agreed that Peynado believed it was 
useless to try to reach a settlement through negotiations with the 
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military governor. 
The policy and course of action which Welles outlined in October, 
1921, and which he instituted the following February \\rith the approval 
of Hughes and Harding, set the stage for the closing chapter on the 
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Dominican occupation. The Wilson Plan and the Harding Plan, though 
rejected, opened the channels of communication between the United 
States and the Dominican Republic. The resultant dialogue served to 
clarify the issues in dispute. The parochial interests of the State 
Department, the American military government, and the Dominican 
leaders, were not clearly recognizable, as were the impediments to a 
negotiated settlement. 
\-Telles' success in these endeavors and the subsequent role he 
played in ending the American occupation suggest that unrelated 
personal problems caused his abrupt resignation from the State Depart-
ment on Harch 15, 1922. Neither Welles' letter of resignation, dated 
Harch 14, 1922, nor other consulted source materials contain a clue 
as to the reason for his departure. Welles left Washington almost 
inunediately for his home in Hassachusetts, where he apparently spent 
the next few weeks. Hughes and Munro remained in Washington to make 
the most of the opportunity Welles had created. 64 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMNER WELLES: COMMISSIONER TO THE 
DOHINICAN REPUBLIC 
The arrival of Dr. Francisco J. Peynado in Hashington marked a 
turning point in United States efforts to reach an agreement vlith 
Dominican leaders on the terms of a plan of \vi thdrmval. This purely 
individual effort on Peynado's part, coupled with the reports that 
t\vo other prominent Dominican political party leaders, Federico 
/ / Velasquez and General Horacia Vasquez, \vould soon send the State 
Department a joint recommendation for holding elections, was a sign 
of an emerging Dominican willingness to cooperate with the United 
States. Prior to Harch, 1922, the Dominicans had been content to 
allm.;r the United States to make the vlithdrmval proposals. Now, 
however, the Dominicans were preparing to present their own proposals 
relative to ending the occupation. 
Peynado first met with Secretary of State Hughes on the morning 
of Harch 18, 1922. In this and in subsequent meetings with Hughes 
and Dana G. Hunro, the new head of the Latin American Affairs Division, 
Peynado presented his view of the situation. He related that the 
Dominicans were disposed to ratify only the acts of the military 
government vlhich conferred rights and obligations and that there vJas 
no obstacle to extending the customs receivership. Peynado protested 
the new loan but recognized there was no viable alternative. He 
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reiterated the strong Dominican opposition to a legation guard or 
military mission and voiced the opinion that life and property would 
not be endangered if the maintenance of order were left to a 
Dominican government. Peynado' s views were basically acceptable to 
the United States but, doubt still remained about the possible danger 
to life and property. According to Munro, however, 11 • • • Hughes was 
disposed to make concessions on this point in order to reach an 
agreement. " 1 Hughes informed Peynado and, subsequently, President 
Harding, that the objective of the United States was to withdraw at 
the earliest moment after a Dominican government capable of maintain-
ing order could be established. The implication '<;-JaS that some 
American troops would remain in the Dominican Republic as long as this 
2 
was considered necessary. 
By the end of Nay, 1922, the situation seemed ripe for another 
attempt at an agreement. Munro, with the assistance of Peynado, 
drafted a new plan of wi thdrmv-al which contained the following 
provisions: 
1. Installation of a provisional government agreeable to 
both nations and formation of a Dominican commission 
to advise the provisional president. 
2. The provisional president would promulgate new elec-
tion lmv-s and oversee the reorganization of government. 
3. A restricted American military government \vould co-
exist with the provisional government. 
4. The conduct of new elections under the existing con-
stitution for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. 
5. The new congress would convoke a constitutional con-
vention to amend the existing constitution. 
6. The election of a new president by electoral colleges; 
cessation of the provisional government. 
7. The elected president to appoint representatives to 
negotiate a convention of evacuation for the with-
drawal of United States military forces. 
8. The withdrawal of American military forces upon 
satisfaction of the convention terms. 
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This arrangement was satisfactory to Secretary Hughes, who was opposed 
to turning over total administration of the Dominican Republic to any-
one except an elected government. It also satisfied Dominican objec-
tions to the conduct of elections under control of the military 
government. In submitting the draft to Secretary Hughes, Munro opined 
that the final plan ought to include the views of other Dominican 
leaders, two of whom were coming to Washington with additional 
proposals. Hunro further suggested that the final plan be worked out 
in the Dominican Republic after a study of local sentiments and 
conditions. To this end, he suggested sending a special representative 
of President Harding to the island to work out the details. This 
special representative would function as an intermediary bet\veen the 
State Department, the military government, and the Dominicans. 3 
Word of Peynado's informal talks reached Santo Domingo and 
accelerated the activities of the party leaders there. Since Peynado 
represented no single party, there was no reason to believe that his 
activities \vere self-serving or a threat to the interests of one 
party over another. Nevertheless, political benefits would accrue to 
the party or parties which could claim to have had an influential 
hand·in restoring Dominican sovereignty. Unaware of the substance of 
the program for withdrawal which Peynado was seeking to arrange, the 
party leaders acted quickly to protect their own interests and, if 
necessary, to counteract whatever Peynado achieved. During April and 
Hay, 1922, leaders of the Partido Nacional and Partido Progresista 
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had expressed their views on withdrawal to Admiral Robinson, the 
military governor, and William W. Russell~ the American minister, and 
made clear their intention of going to Washington to make their own 
presentations. In recognition of the need for unanimous agreement for 
a plan of withdrawal, the leaders of the two remaining political 
parties, the Partid~ Liberal and Partido Unionista, were also invited 
to send representatives to take part in the talks. 4 
The convergence of some of the key Dominican political 
figures on Hashington presented a problem. Neither Hughes nor Munro 
possessed a sufficient depth of knov1ledge of the factors bearing on 
the question of withdrawal to take full advantage of this opportunity 
to achieve a quick agreement. It was certain that regardless of vlho 
was to represent the United States in the upcoming talks with the 
Dominican visitors, he had to possess the requisite diplomatic skill, 
have an intimate knmvledge of the factors involved, and be a man of 
integrity. In April, 1922, Senator Medill NcCormick had intimated 
that he could successfully carry on negotiations with the Dominicans 
if he were appointed High Commissioner to Santo Domingo. 5 lfuether 
or not the Senator was seriously considered for this post is unknown. 
Munro suggested to Hughes that Helles be asked to carry on the 
negotiations with the Dominicans, and the Secretary approved. In his 
letter of Nay 31, 1922, inviting Helles to return to Washington from 
Manchester, Massachusetts, Munro states: 
I believe that the prospects for early withdrawal are more 
favorable than they have hitherto been, and that the right 
man could give us a definite and workable program which 
would command the support of the native leaders.6 
Munro also informed Welles in his letter that he had " ..• suggested 
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that a representative of the president be appointed to be sent to 
Santo Domingo to work out the plan . . .. 7 Welles immediately 
reported to the Latin American Affairs Divi£d.on and in a letter dated 
June 7, 1922, informed Hughes that he would be" ..• very much 
inclined to undertake a trip to Santo Domingo if offered the 
opportunity." 8 
By mid-June, 1922, the men who would participate in these critic-
al negotiations were either on their way to Washington or were already 
there. Significantly absent from the talks would be the American 
military governor of the Dominican Republic, Rear-Admiral Samuel S. 
Robinson. The series of events during the first few months of 1922 
provided the vehicle by which the State Department reasserted its 
control over United States-Dominican affairs. Robinson had been ex--
cluded from the discussions betv1een Peynado, Hughes, and Munro, and 
had apparently not been fully informed of their results. To cement 
Robinson's exclusion and in recognition of the obstacle he posed to 
withdrawal, the State Department opted to negotiate directly with the 
Dominicans until the plan was finalized. 
Welles entered the conference enthusiastically; doubtless a 
compromising attitude on the part of the Dominican leaders proved 
helpful. After acquainting himself with the efforts of Peynado and 
Hunro, Welles met with Va'squez and Velfsquez. He found that in this 
and in other conferences with the Dominicans, "no fundamental dif-
ferences occurred as to what the United States felt were necessary 
steps or as to the nature of those steps."9 On the same day as his 
meeting with va"squez and Vela"squez, Welles submitted for Secretary 
Hughes' approval a draft of a plan of evacuation which incorporated 
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many of the features of the proposal suggested by Peynado and Munro, 
and his own recommendations for satisfying his two objections to the 
plan. Welles doubted, despite their claims to the contrary, that 
v{squez and Vellsquez controlled a majority of the Dominican elector-
ate. Under the Munro-Peynado proposal, the Dominican leaders would 
select a provisional president. It was Welles' belief that the 
politicians who selected the provisional president should in fact 
represent the majority of the Dominican people. He reco~nended that 
before the United States agree to the proposed method of selecting 
the provisional president" ..• a satisfactory investigation ... 
be made by a duly authorized representative . ulO of the United 
States. Welles' second objection concerned his belief that before 
the United States could safely withdraw the new Dominican government 
must ratify a convention of evacuation negotiated by the t>vo nations. 
Welles changed the wording of the plan's provisions relating to the 
. f . . . "f" . 11 conventlon o evacuatlon to lnsure lts ratl lcatlon. Hughes 
approved both of ~~elles' suggestions. The proposed plan was next 
submitted to va.'squez, Vellsquez,· and Peynado, who all agreed to a fe~.J 
minor changes. On June 30, 1922, a final memorandum of the details 
of the plan was prepared; the Dominican conferees signed this version 
on July 3, 1922.12 
Coincident with the agreement on the tentative plan of evacuation, 
President Harding appointed Welles "Commissioner with the rank of 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary." Welles was: 
To represent the President of the United States in the 
Dominican Republic for the purpose of investigating and 
repor-ting upon political conditions in the Dominican 
Republic, and for the purpose of ascertaining the views 
of the Dominican people with respect to an appropriate 
agreement with the United States, as a result of which 
the military forces of the United States may be with-
drawn from the Dominican Republic.l3 
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The Dominicans asked that Welles' appointment not be made public im-
mediately.ll~ This delay would enable them to inform their constitu-
ents of the plan and to prepare the public for VJelles' arrival. 
There was an initial understanding, at the urging of Welles, 
that the details of the plan should be held confidential until Welles 
arrived in Santo Domingo or until he agreed to make it public. Accord-
ing to Welles, confidentiality was important for two reason. First, 
the United States had not yet determined the composition of the com-
mission which \vould select and advise the provisional president; 
announcement that a commission would be formed for this purpose would 
likely produce a demand by all political factions for representation 
on the commission. Second, the specific acts of the military govern-
ment 'tvhich would need to be ratified remained uniden tified. 15 A third 
reason for keeping the details of the plan confidential was revealed 
by Francis Vlhite, who replaced Hunro as Chief of the Latin American 
Affairs Division. White related· to Welles that he had received an 
"interesting, albeit anonymous" letter which confirmed his "distrust" 
of Peynado and that 
no loopholes [should] be open for an anti-American 
campaign for internal political motives ... that no 
opportunity should be granted any one of them to pose as 
having exacted concessions which could be used in such a 
campaign.l6 
Apparently, Dr. Peynado, the most apolitical of the Dominican leaders, 
had considered starting a political career. For all these reasons 
Welles insisted upon keeping the plan confidential. 
The tentative plan of evacuation provided for a provisional 
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president and a cabinet elected by a majority vote of a commission 
/ / 
composed of Vasquez, Velasquez, Peynado, and Elias Brache representing 
the Partido Liberal. By mutual agreement of these four men, Monsignor 
Adolfo Nouel, the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, was also named to the 
commission. The commission would determine the provisional govern-
ment 1 s limits of authority and would fill all vacancies occurring in 
the provisional government. The provisional government, upon 
inauguration, would immediately take over all executive departments 
and would be assisted by the respective officials of the military 
government. Expenditures above budgetary limits could be made only 
with the approval of the Military Governor. The Military Governor 
would delegate the necessary pm.;rer to the provisional government to 
carry out the plan. He would retain authority over the military oc-
cupation forces and concentrate them in not more than three places as 
determined by him. The Dominican constabulary would maintain peace 
and order; the occupation forces would provide support in the case of 
serious disturbances. The Provisional President would provide for 
enabling legislation and constitutional amendments relative to the 
holding of elections and the reorganization of provincial and town 
governments. An elected congress would pass a law ratifying the acts 
of the military government listed in a convention of evacuation 
negotiated by the provisional government with the United States and 
ratified by the Dominican congress. 
In the convention of evacuation, the Dominican government would 
recognize the validity of legal contracts and all executive and 
departmental orders of the military government which levied taxes, 
authorized expenditures, or established rights on behalf of third 
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persons. The contracts and orders, which were to be listed separately 
I 
in the convention, would be recognized as law from the date of issue 
until lawfully abolished or annulled; no authority could take any 
action revoking the rights acquired under them. The convention would 
recognize the validity of the bond issues of 1918 and 1922 and the 
extension of the customs receivership to insure amortization of these 
b d . 17 on 1ssues. 
A summary of the plan and announcement of Welles' appointment 
was published in American and Dominican newspapers in mid-July, 1922. 
William W. Russell, the American minister, reported the news prompted 
public excitement and immediate "rabid talk" from the proponents of 
"pure and simple evacuation".l8 Welles termed initial opposition to 
the plan "intense" as a result of efforts of nationalista groups which 
wanted Henriquez y Carbajal reinstalled as provisional president. 
Hany Dominicans hurled charges of treason and betrayal against the men 
who had helped form the plan, but these ~en, according to Welles, 
earned the support of ';saner" elements of the people in their campaign 
to explain the plan. 19 Newspaper accounts of the Dominican conferees"' 
explanation of the plan show that each described it properly and 
fairly and urged that it be accepted. The plan was generally presented 
as a proposal offered by Dominicans to the United States, and one 
which posed the best possibility of withdrawal. The respective con-
ferees claimed credit for certain features of the plan, but no one 
20 gained any immediate political advantage. 
Welles and his party of four arrived in Santo Domingo at noon on 
July 29, 1922, having been transported to Santo Domingo aboard a Navy 
21 
torpedo boat dispatched for this purpose. He immediately issued a 
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statement to the press which he believed created a favorable impres-
sian and influenced some nacionalistas to support the plan. Comments 
in his press release were as follows: 
The United States . . • has never had, and has not now, 
any secret purposes to conceal or any selfish motives 
to further •.. , has no desire and no intention of 
assuming the right of intervention in, or control over 
Dominican affairs. 22 
On July 30 Helles held a press conference during which he announced 
that the plan would be published when the acts requiring ratification 
were identified and the members of the commission had been named. He 
also stated that the United States wanted a guarantee of a responsible 
government capable of maintaining peace and order, independence, and 
. . 1 . . 23 terrltorla lntegrlty. The two daily newspapers in Santo Domingo 
published the contents of Welles' interview and the next day printed 
editorials supporting the plan. Welles regarded this as a favorable 
24 sign because these newspapers had opposed all earlier proposals. 
In addition to his appeal to the nacionalistas through the press, 
Helles sought Henriquez y Carbajal's support of the plan. As primary 
spokesman for the leader of the·nationalistas, Henriquez y Carbajal's 
backing would virtually guarantee the plan's acceptance and allow the 
en tire process of ,.Ji thdrawal to proceed smoothly. The nacionalis tas 
had not been represented in the negotiations up to this point, and, 
unless Henriquez y Carbajal came out in support of the plan, they 
would not be represented on the commission. Helles' contacts with 
Henriquez y Carbajal failed to garner his support of the plan, but 
as time passed many nacionalistas abandoned Henriquez y Carbajal and 
joined other parties. 25 
During the first week of August, 1922, Welles visited the major 
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population centers of the Dominican Republic to gauge the strength of 
the key political parties and to explain the proposed convention and 
the steps leading to evacuation. He had already received reports of 
general acceptance of the plan from the Dominican conferees, but he 
needed to be certain. In each tmm he visited, Welles listened to the 
personal opinions of the leading citizens. The sentiment of the 
public, which greeted him in crowds of "from 2,000 to a few hundreds," 26 
convinced him that an "oven7helming majority 11 were in favor of the 
plan. / / He also concluded that Vasquez, Velasquez, and Brache, the 
three Dominican political party leaders who had signed the plan the 
previous July in Washington, represented eighty per cent of the 
electorate. The remaining twenty per cent of the voters were political-
ly non-aligned and followers of the fourth signatory, Peynado. 
Having determined the political conditions and the vie<vs of the 
people toward the plan, Welles recornmended that the four signatories 
of the plan and Archbishop Nouel serve as members of the commission to 
select the provisional government. He also requested authority to 
publish officially the proposed plan at a time he deemed appropriate. 
In order to counter the suspicion that could arise from a long delay 
in announcing the agreement, Welles wanted the freedom to publish the 
plan without a complete list of the orders and contracts to be 
ratified. The State Department approved both suggestions. 27 
If the nacionalistas were an overt threat to the plan, Rear-
Admiral Robinson, the military governor, was a covert opponent and 
much more dangerous. Before Welles arrived in the Dominican Republic, 
the State -Department had to intervene in an incident which could have 
undermined the negotiations. The State Department received information 
89 
in early July, 1922, that a provost court had convicted six or seven 
young Dominicans for what the State Department termed " •.. purely 
political offe~ses." Robinson received immediate instructions to 
suspend the imposed fine of $3,000 or five years imprisonment and to 
refrain in the future from prosecuting such offenders. 28 Other dif-
ficulties soon followed. 
After having been in the Dominican Republic for a few days, Welles 
informed Robinson that the plan was a "definite agreement" and was 
"tentative" only in that its publication would be delayed. Welles 
went on to assert that only he should submit amendments to the plan 
f h • d • • I • d . 29 or t e appo1nte commlSSlon s consl erat1on. Robinson apparently 
took this latter statement as an invitation from 1-Jelles to propose 
amendments to the plan, and he urged the Department of the Navy to 
insist on several changes. The most significant of these proposals 
would have delayed the provisional president's assumption of command 
over the national constabulary, permitted Dominican military officers 
to supplement the officer ranks of the constabulary until February 23, 
1923, and established a deadline of Harch 1, 1924, for the inauguration 
of an elected Dominican government. If such requirements '\·lere not met, 
the United States government would again assume control of the 
Dominican Republic. Robinson also desired protection for the military 
government and occupation forces from insults from the press, but he 
could not .find the "proper wording" for this. 30 It seems that 
Robinson's intentions were, to be sure, honorable. He thought it 
would be very difficult for the military governement and the provisional 
government to co-exist and share authority to govern the nation. He 
stated that the constabulary, especially the officers, needed more 
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training if peace and order were to be maintained. He believed a 
serious miscalculation of the ability of the constabulary had been 
made. He told Welles that President Harding had been "led to believe" 
that the constabulary was sufficiently trained and organized but that 
this was not so. 31 Welles may have agreed with Robinson on this 
point, but he was compelled to honor the commitments that had been 
made. 
Welles' general opposition to modifying the plan Has based on 
the fact the Dominican leaders who signed the proposal had been 
officially and definitely informed that the United States reserved 
only the right to alter the plan in order to protect the rights of 
persons, businesses, and governments which had acquired property or 
entered into contracts under the occupation. He believed that the 
nature of the amendments which the Military Governor offered would be 
regarded as a breach of faith and would lead to the termination of the 
negotiations. Welles offered to discuss some of the points raised by 
Robinson with the commission members, but he adamantly refused to 
discuss with the Dominicans any· 11 , •• neT.v guise of the military 
mission .•• , which was unanimously rejected by the Dominican people.-" 32 
William H. Russell, the American minister, supported Welles. The State 
Department fully approved Welles' position and prevailed upon the 
Department of the Navy to instruct Robinson that he shall suggest no 
changes in the plan except in conjunction \vith Welles. Robinson also 
was informed that "absolute cooperation" with Welles was essential. 33 
This instruction firmly established Welles' authority in the negotia-
tions for a final plan and made him the arbiter between the commission 
and Robinson concerning the training of the constabulary and all other 
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matters. 
Because the training of the officers to lead the constabulary 
was by August, 1922, progressing slowly, Welles was forced to relent 
and discuss the matter with the commission. At the initial meeting, 
Robinson specifically requested that the military government continue 
to train the constabulary under the provisional government. According 
to a report of the meeting, Welles considered the United States so 
committed to placing the constabulary under the command of the pro-
visional government that he suggested no change be made in the plan. 34 
Instead, Welles secured a compromise to the effect that prior to 
election of a provisional president~ a Dominican commandant would be 
appointed to head the constabulary. The commandant would then 
appoint Dominicans with military training and good records to replace 
the American officers, who would withdraw from the force when the 
provisional government took office. The training of recruits and 
officers would be the responsibility of the military government during 
the life of the provisional presidency. General Buenaventura Cabral, 
a provincial governor who t,·as not affiliaJ:ed with a political party, 
was appointed to the commandant post. 35 
During August and September, 1922, Welles met with the commis-
sion almost daily to prepare the final plan of wi thdrmval. In 
Welles 1 view the "conunission afforded a common meeting ground of 
diverse party views and thus provided assurance that all factions 
could voice their desires and vietvs. " 36 These meetings also provided 
a forum wherein Welles could mediate the numerous, and in many cases, 
grave disputes between the military government and the commission. 
The commission succeeded in drafting a new election latv and a law 
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reorganizing the provincial and town governments. Perhaps the most 
important and the most time consuming project was the listing of the 
military government's orders and contracts that were to be ratified 
in the convention of evacuation. Welles criticized the military 
government for taking so long to compile the list. 37 The only new 
provision added to the actual plan of withdrawal permitted the 
Dominican courts to settle controversies arising from the rights 
acquired under the military government and to submit to arbitration 
any such controversies involving United States interests. A final 
potential problem was resolved whe·n the State Department authorized 
Welles to state that if the Dominicans met the terms of the agreement, 
the United States would vlithdraw its forces even though the United 
States Senate might not ratify the convention of evacuation. The 
plan of withdrawal, in its final form, was approved and signed on 
Septerr.ber 18, 19 22, and was published throughout the Dominican Republic 
five days later. 38 
Welles was mindful that the internal cooperation of the members 
of the commission had produced an acceptable plan of withdrawal, and 
he hoped this cooperative attitude would persist. He also was aware 
that when the time arrived to select a provisional president, the 
commission members would succumb to party politics. In August, 1922, 
Welles believed that after installation of the provisional government, 
V{squez and Vel{squez, representing the Partido Nacional 2nd the 
Partido Prozresistas, respectively, would join forces. Together these 
two would oppose Elias Brache, the leader of the Partido Liberal. 
Peynado continued to represent the independent vote, but he report-
edly favored joining the Partido Liberal. This would place Archbishop 
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Nouel, the fifth member pf the,commission, in the position of casting 
the deciding vote, but he, too, was believed to favor the Partido 
Liberal. A month later, it appeared more certain that Peynado had 
joined with the Partido Liberal and \vould perhaps be that party's 
presidential candidate. This situation threatened the political 
balance of the commission, which had not completed work on the election 
laws or selected a provisional president. Pressure was brought to bear 
on Peynado to maintain his independent status. He agreed to do so, 
at least for a while, and stated in writing to the commission that he 
had no political ambitions or ties to any party. He promised to re-
sign from the commission if he decided to become a candidate. 39 
The political balance temporarily restored, the commission chose 
Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos as provisional president. Vicini Burgos 
had never participated in Dominican politics and he was not a 
member of any political party. He was a weal thy businessman \·lith real 
estate and sugar interests in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. 
He was considered to be a man of honesty and integrity with feelings 
of friendship toward the Dnited States. The Provisional President 
picked his cabinet from lists submitted by party leaders and selected 
two ministers from each party. The installation of the provisional 
government was delayed until October 21, 1922, to afford time for 
Dominican officers to replace American officers in the constabulary. 40 
At the same time that the commission was selecting the provisional 
president, it began finalizing arrangements for the election of a 
government. In this regard, the commission asked that Robinson re-
strict American troops to designated points of concentration and that 
he prohibit them from visiting nearby towns and cities on election day. 
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The commission believed that this action was necessary to avoid the 
impression the military government was observing the conduct of the 
elections. The commission also thought it wise to minimize contact 
between American troops and the Dominican people during this period 
of unusual excitement. Robinson strenuously objected to the requests 
and took offense at the implication that American troops, by their 
mere presence in the towns and cities, would be guilty of wrongdoing. 
Robinson did offer to order his troops to stay away from the polling 
places, but he declined to restrict them otherwise unless it was 
absolutely necessary. Welles, who believed the commission's view 
correct, asked the State Department to resolve the problem through 
the Department of the Navy. Subsequently, Robinson received instruc-
tions from the Department of the Navy to comply with the commission's 
request and a reminder to cooperate with Welles. Robinson protested 
his instructions, but to no avail. This disagreement, coupled with 
Robinson's efforts to have American naval officers assigned to con-
duct a financial audit of a 1908 bond issue, precipitated a request 
that he leave the island upon installation of the provisional govern-
ment on October 21, 1922. The admiral's departure on October 23, 1922, 
\vas a statement of confidence in the provisional government and 
served to decrease the level of friction between the military govern-
d h . . 41 ment an. t e comm1ss1on. 
With the installation of the provisional government, Welles 
considered that his mission in the Dominican Republic was finished. 
The obligations of the provisional government were, according to Welles, 
clearly de-fined and unders toad, and he foresaw no real problem in 
obtaining final approval and enactment of the important election law. 
95 
Brigadier General Harry Lee, the acting military governor, had created 
a favorable impression and was getting on well with the new provision-
al government. The developments over the past few months had improved 
the image of William Russell, the American minister, who seemed capable 
of mediating any disputes between the military and provisional govern-
ments. Although Welles was optimistic about the future, he indicated 
his willingness to return to the island if disturbances did arise. 
The State Department approved Welles' departure, despite requests from 
Vicini Burgos, the provisional president, and the commissioners that 
his mission be continued until the inauguration of an elected presi-
dent. In the light of subsequent events leading to the election of a 
president, the requests that Welles' mission be continued may have 
been a veiled statement that steady progress on the plan of withdrawal 
required the moderating influence of Welles' presence. 42 
Almost immediately after Welles' departure from the island on 
October 27, 1922, partisan politics and corruption began to effect the 
efficient operation of both the provisional government and the 
advisory commission. The minister of health and the minister of 
finance ~vere removed for mis-handling funds to the benefit of their 
respective political parties. The minister of the interior, who like 
Burgos, was politically non-aligned, resigned after a disagreement 
with the provisional president. The commission members turned their 
attention ·to the upcoming elections, and there were fewer and fe>ver 
commission meetings and decreased contact between the commission and 
the provisional government. Russell, the American minister, was unable 
to keep the commission busy at the task of finalizing the election lmv 
and other legislation. Perhaps out of embarrassment over the way 
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things were progressing, Russe~l delayed informing Welles and the 
State Department. On November 28, 1922, Welles, who was in Washing-
ton preparing for the Washington Conference of 1922-1923 on Central 
American Affairs, asked Russell if the election law had been 
promulgated, and, if not, when it would be. In his·r.e.ply dated the 
next day, Russell stated that the law would be published within ten 
days but it would not be presented to the provisional president for 
promulgation until 11 the people" had had an opportunity to suggest 
changes. The election law, ~.;rhich Welles considered unnecessarily 
delayed by the commission's lack of initiative, was finally 
promulgated on Harch 9, 1923. 43 
In an effort to insure that the elections would take place so 
that it would not be necessary to extend the life of the provisional 
and military governments, Welles returned to the Dominican Republic 
in April, 1923. He was greeted by a new Dominican political align-
ment which threatened the entire withdrawal effort. It had been 
generally recognized in early 1922 that if Peynado had remained 
neutral, he would have received the support of the major parties and 
would have been elected president. However, the Partido Liberal 
lacked a strong potential candidate and courted Peynado. In January, 
1923, Peynado accepted the nomination of the Partido Liberal, which 
later entered into a coalition with other foll~1ers of former Presi-
dent Juan Isidro Jime'nez. This coalition called itself the Partido 
de la Coalicion Nacional Patriotica and as a body backed Peynado for 
the presidency. Peynado, to his credit, honored his earlier promise 
and resigned from the commission. Peynado's candidacy moved the 
velasquestas and the horacistas closer to a union since the two 
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parties together could expect to command a majority vote in a general 
. ll4 
elect1on. 
Upon his arrival, Welles met with the commission and explained 
that unless that body. aompleted its work, elections could not be held 
and the occupation would, of course, continue. At a meeting on April 
4, 1923, the commission agreed to constitute the election boards and, 
subsequently, announce a ninety day period for voter registration. 
Under the schedule adopted, the election vmuld take place on 
approximately October 1, 1923. Since the provisional presidency was 
due to expire on August 16, 1923, the commission agreed to extend its 
life until December 31. The central election board positions were 
filled on April 10 and the local election boards, with some difficulty, 
were formed during the following weeks. Assured by the commissioners 
that voter registration would proceed without delay and after deter-
mining that the constabulary was maintaining peace and order and that 
relations between the military and provisional governments was satis-
factory, Welles returned to Washington on May 17.45 
The State Department and Welles had made a concerted effort to 
stay outside the partisan political activities of the various parties. 
Welles took great care to recommend solutions to problems so that no 
one party gained an advantage or appeared to have the support of the 
United States. During his most recent visit to the Dominican 
Republic, Welles detected an effort by the velasquestas and horacistas 
to convince the public that the United States and American-owned sugar 
interests favored the election of Peynado. Allegations such as these, 
according-to Welles, would only encourage voters to choose on the 
basis of their attitude toward the United States rather than vote for 
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responsible government for their nation. Also, if the United States 
was portrayed as having influenced the election, it would be dif-
ficult for the United States to assist the victor, regardless of who 
it was, in solving the problems that lay ahead. Welles appealed to 
the candidates, all members of the commission, to respect American 
impartiality in the election campaign. 46 
As time for the elections drew near, the commission ceased to 
function because its members were busy campaigning. By August, 1923, 
Vasquez and Velasquez had formed an alliance whereby the latter would 
run for vice--president and the fot·mer Hould seek the presidency. 
Cabinet members and government employees who owed their allegiance to 
va'squez and Velasquez now formed a majority in the provisional cabinet 
in particular and in the provisional government in general. 
The future of the alliance seemed assured, but it had not cal-
culated on the partiality of the Central Election Board. It was 
suspected that the Central Election Board favored the election of 
Peynado. In September, 19 23, the Central Election Board, which vias 
re.sponsible for insuring compliance with the election law, refused to 
accept as valid the alliance nominees, va'squez and Vela'squez. The 
decision was based on the fact that the alliance representatives in 
the large province of La Vega had violated the election law. It 
seems that an original and certified copy of the alliance nominations 
had been submitted, instead of the required original and duplicate 
original. This decision infuriated the alliance parties. If the 
decision were allowed to stand, then Paynado would win the election. 
In response, representatives of vfsquez and Velisquez began impeach-
ment proceedings against two members of the Central Election Board. 
The alliance's action seriously endangered elections scheduled for 
early October.47 
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Welles tried to resolve this latest crisis through cabled in-
structions to Russell, the American minister. He lauded the impar-
tiality and strict enforcement of the law by the election board, but 
he recognized that a more flexible interpretation of the election law 
was necessary if the "election experiment" was to be successful. He 
suggested that Burgos, the provisional president, approach the Central 
Election Board with a plan to withhold confirmation of the nominations 
until the missing duplicate original was received. This appeared to 
be a simple and reasonable solution. However, Burgos balked at the 
suggestion because it would make him appear partial. In addition, 
impeachment proceedings brought the Central Election Board's work to 
a complete stop. The entire controversy forced another postponement 
of the elections.48 
Welles returned to Santo Domingo on November 3, 1923, and over a 
period of several days met with the commission aud tne two presi-
dential candidates, V~squez and Peynado. He told them that the 
policy of obstruction the two opposing groups were following would 
cause cancellation of the elections, and, if this happened, the United 
States would" ... reserve entire liberty to determine its course of 
action." 49 From his examination of the situation, Welles determined 
that both the alliance candidate, v£squez, and the coalition candidate, 
Peynado, had secured technical advantages, and he appealed to the 
candidates to give them up. He suggested the parties return to an 
equal status. He proposed the elections be postponed, the election 
law amended, and new election boards be established. In addition, 
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Peynado's coalition would obtain additional posts in the provisional 
government to offset the majority position of the rival alliance 
parties. The Dominican leaders accepted the offer and the election 
was postponed until the necessary revised legislation was promulgated 
50 by Burgos. 
While the commission rewrote the election laws and related legis-
lation, Welles sought public pledges from the candidates to keep the 
constabulary apolitical. / He also sought to have Vasquez and Peynado 
agree on the one most qualified person for each elective office and 
present him as their joint nomine~ for office. He asked each to abide 
by the civil service law and make promotions on the basis of merit. 
Finally, he urged that they ignore party affiliations in the selection 
of cabinet appointees. The candidates professed support for all 
these suggestions, but neither was in a position to accomplish the 
ideals they embodied. Welles was not being naive in making the sug-
gestions. The Dominicans had been favorably responsive to nearly all 
of his ideas, and it was undoubtedly worth the effort if it would re-
51 
sult in capable people serving in the government. 
The campaign under the new law began on January 15, 1924, and 
the election machinery worked well up through the actual balloting on 
March 15. Welles chose to stay in the Dominican Republic until after 
the elections. Recalling the problems of the recent past, his pres-
ence no doubt contributed to the success of the elections by curbing 
political excesses on the part of the candidates and their parties. 
During the campaign, both the alliance and coalition groups again 
tried to capitalize on anti-American sentiment by alleging that the 
United States supported the opposing candidate. Welles, in a public 
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statement, reasserted United States neutrality by stating that both 
candidates were acceptable to his government, and that the sole 
interest of the United States was to give the Dominican people free-
52 dam of choice. 
By early February it became apparent that Vfsquez, the alliance 
candidate, would win the election. Welles reported to the State 
Department that Peynado was considering withdrawing from the race 
because he had expended all of his personal funds and because the 
financial contributions of his supporters, who were certain of defeat, 
had declined markedly. Peynado offered to reach an agreement with 
V{squez which would guarantee Peynado's coalition representation in 
the congress and provincial offices. In return, Peynado and the coal-
ition would support V~quez's candidacy. Peynado also suggested that 
/ both he and Vasquez withdraw from the race and subsequently support 
Vel{squez or some other compromise candidate. Writing in 1928, 
Welles stated that the coalition was willing to make almost any 
/ 
sacrifice to prevent the election of Vasquez and even attempted to 
convince him to withdraw from the race on the basis that his election 
would cause widespread dissatisfaction. v{squez apparently recognized 
the absurdity of these suggestions and rejected the proposal. Welles, 
although aware of the coalition's efforts to arrange a deal, was 
careful not to interfere in this purely political problem. He 
informed the State Department in early February that he favored an 
agreement which would have given the coalition parties representation 
in the congress and provincial offices in return for coalition support 
of certain alliance candidates. Such an agreement would put the 
ablest man in office, which is what he urged the candidates to agree 
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to do earlier. However, there is no evidence that Welles ever took 
any action to force an agreement.53 
The Dominican press, in the midst of the campaign, continued its 
support of the plan of withdrawal and expressed serious concern that 
partisan politics would deprive the Dominican Republic of its sover-
eignty and the Dominican people of their liberty. One Dominican 
newspaper described the situation as follows: 
The occasion is so fraught with danger and we are so 
near losing the little gain made in two years, owing 
to the madness of partisan conflict, that even the 
optimistic among us view the future with deep concern. 54 
Welles' battle against the effects of partisan politics did not go 
unnoticed in the press, and he was praised for his" ..• impartial 
and just attitude."55 Perhaps the most important contribution of the 
press was its interpretation of what Welles meant when he said that a 
t t f h 1 . ld " . . .. 56 pos-ponemen o tee ect1on wou create a very grave s1tuat1on. 
According to the Dominican newspaper El Listin Diario it meant that: 
•.. military intervention would continue indefinitely, 
that our fondest hope of independence would be forever 
ruined, that •v-e would lose all the benefits of self-
government by the \-laste of all our efforts toward 
l "b 57 1 erty ..•• 
While this interpretation was an overstatement of what the United 
States would have done, it was a clear reminder that under the plan 
of withdrawal the military government and American troops were not to 
be removed until a constitutional government had negotiated and 
ratified a convention of evacuation. 
The election did take place as scheduled on March 15, 1924. 
I Vasquez was elected president by a near two-to-one margin over Peynado 
and the alliance parties acquired large majorities in both houses of 
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Congress. Following the election, Peynado established a precedent by 
congratulating va'squez and promising to support him. The convention 
of evacuation was signed without incident on June 12, 1924. Welles 
had left the Dominican Republic four weeks earlier to help reestab-
lish constitutional government in Honduras. By v{squez's inauguration 
day on July 12, American troops had already begun to leave the 
Dominican Republic. On September 18 the American minister cabled 
that all provisions of the plan of Hithdrawal were complete and that 
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all of the forces of occupation had left the country. 
Before leaving the Dominican Republic for Honduras, Welles had 
arranged for President-elect va'squez to confer Hith State Department 
officials in Hashington concerning ways the United States could help 
his government. The visit, VJith \\Telles present, took place in June, 
1924. / It appeared that Vasquez would now accept the assistance pre-
viously offered as a condition of termination of the occupation. 
However, an anti-American attitude on the part of the Dominican people 
would not permit any form of cooperation that suggested American con-
trol or limited Dominican authority. Until his resignation from the 
State Department in July, 1925, Welles urged v£squez to continue the 
spirit of cooperation which ended the occupation. His efforts were 
not very successful. A short-term loan was arranged as part of the 
new convention that replaced the Treaty of 1907; however, without the 
threat of continued occupation, vfsquez was free to exercise his 
authority and Dominican sovereignty as far as was practical. The 
United States was willing to let him do so, as long as the island's 
obligations were met. Dana G. Munro is probably correct in his con-
elusions that nationalistic opposition, VaSquez's necessary use of 
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political patronage and access to government funds, and general 
opposition to any foreign interference in the use of government funds 
would have made it impossible for Welles to revive Dominican coopera-
tion during a planned visit to the Dominican Republic in mid-1925. 59 
~Jelles did not have another opportunity to go to the Dominican 
Republic in an official capacity. President Coolidge's opposition to 
Welles' marriage to the former wife Olf one of his senator friends is 
generally accepted as the reason for Welles' abrupt resignation from 
the State Department on July 13, 1925. President Coolidge, in a note 
dated July 9, 1925, to the acting Secretary of State, Joseph G. Grew, 
said, ''If Welles is now in the Government Service, he should be dis-
missed from the service."60 As already noted, Welles did resign, but 
he did not cease offering friendly advice to President visquez. Welles 
became known as vcfsquez' s "unofficial advisor" and helped him obtain 
the services of an American agricultural expert. I.Jhen financial dif-
ficulties arose in 1929, Welles helped persuade former Vice-President 
of the United States, Charles G. Dmv-es, to lead an American commission 
to advise the Dominican government on fiscal legislation, taxation, 
and budget. The Dawes commission was greeted with suspicion, but 
Welles, who went with Dawes, helped to calm Dominican fear that their 
financial sovereignty was about to suffer added encroachments. Thus, 
in these ways and through personal contacts with his Dominican friends, 
Welles tried to keep alive the policy of friendly cooperation. 61 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The eminent scholar Samuel Flagg Bemis defined imperialism in 
his book, ~ Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, 
as "the exercise of dominion or control over alien peoples against 
their vlill". 1 Applying this definition to the La tin American policy 
of the United States in the Caribbean during the first twenty years 
of the twentieth century reveals that the United States \vas, indeed, 
an imperialistic power. The primary reason for United States 
imperialism was strategic; the Isthmian canal and its approaches had 
to be protected from European encroachments which threatened United 
States security. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and 
the Platt Amendment were not only intended as statements of self-
defense on the part of the United States, but were also intended to 
"legalize" interventions undertaken in direct pursuit of the ultimate 
goal of United States security. The United States military occupation 
of the Dominican Republic in 1916 was an expression of the United 
States policy. Unfortunately, the occupation took place despite the 
fact that no immediate threat of European intervention existed and 
despite the lack of any agreement, written or oral, between the two 
nations "legalizing" the occupation. In short, the occupation was 
United States imperialism at its worst. 
The record of Sumner Welles' involvement with the Dominican 
11.0 
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occupation reveals that he was not opposed to the goal of the United 
. 
States Caribbean policy or to the objectives of that policy. Writing 
in 1924, Welles commented that the policy of the United States toward 
Cuba was also applicable to other Caribbean nations. He saw in the 
United States policy toward Cuba a concern for the welfare of the 
Cuban people as well as a concern for the secur:lty of the United 
States. These two interests were compatible, and United States actions 
under this policy, including military interventions, were supportive 
of the relationship. Proof of this, as Welles saw it, lay in the fact 
that as soon as order was restored in Cuba, the occupation forces 
were withdrm.;ran. Thus, United States policy toward Cuba was not im-
2 
perialis tic and \-JaS not a threat to Cuban sovereignty. 
According to Helles, an additional factor militated against any 
charge of imperialism insofar as intervention in Cuba \vas concerned. 
It has already been pointed out that Helles was apprehensive over the 
"legality" of United States actions in the application of its foreign 
policy. This concern with legality was present in his interpretation 
of United States-Caribbean policy from 1900 to 1920, and, as will be 
illustrated subsequently, in his role in the termination of the 
Dominican occupation. With regard to Cuba, it was Welles' belief that 
the Platt Amendment was the legal basis for United States intervention. 
The Platt Amendment provisions, included as they were in the Cuban 
constitution and in a treaty betHeen the United States and Cuba, meant 
that United States interventions \vere undertaken with Cuban consent. 
Welles considered that Cuban consent, coupled with the fact that inter-
ventions occurring under the Platt Amend~~nt were always for the pur-
pose agreed upon and were always temporary measures, rendered 
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allegations of imperialism meaningless and lacking in credibility. 
The chronic instability in the Dominican Republic posed a threat 
similar in many ways to the menace posed by conditions in Cuba. 
Since the Platt Amendment was a bilateral agreement only between Cuba 
and the United States, it could not be used to justify American inter-
vention to settle Dominican instability. Instead, the Roosevelt 
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was offered as a way of achieving the 
objectives of United States-Caribbean policy. Welles looked upon the 
RooseveJ.t corollary in much the same way that he viewed the Platt 
Amendment -- as a non-imperialistic instrument which did not threaten 
the sovereignty of the Caribbean nations. According to Welles, had 
President Theodore Roosevelt intended the corollary as a basis for 
imperialism, he would not have taken limited action in the Dominican 
Republic in 1904, but would have yielded to suggestions for annexation 
or a protectorate? Instead, through friendly assistance and mutual 
cooperation, a treaty setting up a customs receivership \vas estab-
lished. Welles' view of the treaty was stated thus: 
The powers granted the United States •.. did not constitute 
a greater infringement of the sovereignty of the Dominican 
Republic than that which had already existed since the time 
whe~ ~resident Heureaux had al~e~ated the contro~ of 4 
Domlnlcan customs from the Domlnlcan government ltself. 
Roosevelt's willingness to cooperate on terms of friendly equality 
forms the core of Welles' ideas concerning United States-Latin 
American relations. The Taft and Wilson administrations, in Welles' 
opinion, made little or no effort toward" •.• cooperating with the 
Latin American Republics on terms of friendly equality The 
bitterness ond resentment that resulted from this lack of effort con-
vinced Welles of the wisdom of a policy which respected the saver-
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eignty of a nation. 
The termination of the Unfted States occupation of the Dominican 
Republic was an opportunity for Welles to test and develop his ideas 
on hemispheric policy. Welles did not test a new policy; rather, he 
formulated and developed ways and means of achieving the objectives 
of an already existent policy. These ways and means, as Welles 
envisioned them, would respect the sovereignty of the Dominican 
Republic and would be considerate of the desires and aspirations of 
the Dominican people. He anticipated that the results obtained would 
be of long lasting benefit to both nations and that the process of 
withdrawal would exemplify the friendly cooperation of the United 
States. 
Helles' respect for Dominican sovereignty was a basis for his 
seeking to end the occupation. He believed that the United States had 
no contractural right to intervene militarily in the Dominican 
Republic. He considered the charge that the Dominican government had 
violated the terms of the Treaty of 1907 a weak excuse for the com-
plete takeover that occurred. Although other more valid purposes 
uere served by the occupation, there was a high probability, in 
Welles' opinion, that the difficulties posed by conditions in the 
Dominican Republic could have been eased by the expansion of trade 
through lower tariffs and financial support for the Dominican govern-
6 
ment. Thus, the landing of American troops in the Dominican 
Republic and the establishment of a military government were contrary 
to the true interest of the Roosevelt corollary, if not an outright 
perversion of it. The Dominican Republic, in 1916, was suffering 
from internal political and economic problems aggravated by an 
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unfriendly and uncooperative United States government. All that was 
really needed to resolve the problems was a little friendly American 
economic assistance and protection from European debt collecting 
efforts. The occupation was an over-reaction which the Roosevelt 
corollary did not support. 
Welles' inability to reconcile the occupation with any contractual 
arrangement or with the Roosevelt corollary did not account for all 
of his objections to it. As a means of quieting internal political 
rebellion, banditry, and opposition to the occupation forces, the 
American Military Governor promulgated several laws which encroached 
upon individual freedom and liberty. The most onerous of these laws 
provided for strict gun control, press censorship, and American 
military tribunals for political offenses. These laws were not only 
aggressively applied but also were contrary to the democratic founda-
tions which the military government sought to lay. The excessive 
force and control exercised by the military government was largely 
responsible for the Dominican's anti-American attitude and the poor 
relations between the military government and the Dominican people. 
This situation, in turn, doomed the Military Governor's efforts to 
negotiate a plan of v-li thdrmval. 
The military government derived its authority to govern from the 
simple fact that it existed. Unable to justify the occupation on the 
basis of any bilateral agreement with the Dominican Republic or 
through his interpretation of the Roosevelt corollary, Welles ques-
tioned the legality of the military government's existence. Welles 
learned from the State Department's solicitor that the mili.tary govern-
ment had no constitutional authority to govern. The logical extension 
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of this opinion meant that unless the laws, contracts, and other acts 
promulgated by the military government could be sanctioned under the 
Dominican constitution, chaos would result if the United States were 
to withdraw unconditionally. 1be answer to the dilemma was partly 
contained in the provision of the Wilson Plan which provided for 
necessary constitutional changes and law-making. The Harding Plan, 
offered in June, 1921, confronted the dilemma directly by calling for 
ratification of all the acts of the military government as a condition 
for withdrawal. To the Dominicans, such a condition \vas unacceptable. 
The Dominican interpretation of this condition was that they were 
being asked to say "thank you" for the abuses inflicted by the 
military government. \\Telles recognized that Dominican dignity and 
honor would not permit their agreeing to such a proposal. He 
therefore explained and clarified the provision in such a way as to 
remove the implication to which the Dominicans objected. Welles was 
careful not to indicate that the military government's acts had no 
legal foundation. At the same time, the State Department pressured 
the military government to liberalize the terms and applications of 
the censorship laws. Finally, the specific acts to be ratified were 
identified through bilateral negotiations. In this way, Dominican 
dignity and honor was upheld and the beneficial acts of the military 
government were preserved in Dominican law and treaty. 
Although United States policy objectives, if achieved, would 
render future intervention in the Dominican Republic unnecessary, the 
Cuban experience had shown that the possibility of this eventuality 
could not be ignored. Certainly ~elles would have agreed that 
Dominican approval of a treaty permitting American intervention upon 
116 
request would legalize any such action and render it more defensible 
in the court of world opinion. Interestingly, the records consulted 
in this study revealed little that could be interpreted as United 
States insistance on inclusion of such an arrangement in the plan of 
withdrawal or in the Dominican constitution, By June, 1922, the 
idea of providing for the right of intervention in the plan of with-
drawal \vas eliminated completely. This did not mean that the United 
States gave up the use of military intervention as a means of achiev-
ing its policy objectives. Welles, on several occasions, reminded the 
Dominicans that political and economic stability and respect for the 
rights of third parties were essential to the withdrawal plan. The 
implication was that the occupation would continue or would be re-
established if these conditions were not satisfied. 
Welles expressed his position on intervention to the Dominican 
people just prior to the inauguration of the provisional government 
on October 21, 1922. He stated that the United States did not believe 
that it could exercise the same right of intervention in the Dominican 
Republic that it exercised in Cuba since the right of intervention was 
not contained in any bilateral treaty or in the Dominican constitu-
tion. He continued that the United States had not 11 now or ever 
considered it had a contractual right to intervene in Dominican 
affairs." 7 In his explanation of this statement to Secretary Hughes, 
Welles assured him that intervention had been discussed with the 
Dominican commission. He said that this body: 
••• realized that while the United States does not claim, 
and has not claimed, any contractual right to intervene, the 
government of the United States may intervene in the 
Dominican Republic if the Dominican government is unwilling 
or unable to comply with its treaty obligations with the 
United States; or if action were taken by the Dominican 
government which would threaten a violation of the 
Honroe Doctrine or jeopardize the peace of this 
con tin en t. B 
11tis underGtanding on the part of the Dominican commission, 
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coupled with the probability that the Dominican people would oppose 
granting a contractual right of intervention to the United States, 
made inclusion of a Platt Amend:!lent arrangement in the final plan 
of withdrawal unnecessary and perilous. The emphasis of \<Telles' 
diplomacy ~as on friendly cooperation and peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Intervention was relegated to an instrument of last resort; 
diplomacy and arbitration moved into the forefront. Although the 
emerging commitment of the United States to peaceful and cooperative 
methods of settling disputes advanced further in the several treaties 
produced during the Washington Conference on Central American Affairs 
from 1922 to 1923, Helles offered some friendly advice on the 
occasion of the inauguration of the provisional president. He stated 
in his speech that 11My government does not desire to intervene in 
Dominican affairs. 119 The friendly advice implicit in this statement 
was: the Dominican Republic should conduct its politic.al and 
economic affairs in such a way that United States intervention would 
not be necessary. 
Each of the three proposed plans of withdrawal, the Wilson Plan, 
the Harding Plan, and the approved plan, called for the establishment 
of a commission of Dominican leaders to negotiate a final agreement 
with the United States. It was in the negotiations with the commis-
sion that Welles hoped to display a new cooperative attitude of 
the United States. The purpose of the commission was to allow 
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representatives of the Dominican people to express their desires and 
I 
aspirations relative to withdrawal and to draft legislation reflect-
ing Dominican ideals. Unfortunately, Dominican nationalism, political 
jealousy, and a de~p mistrust of the United States, especially of the 
military government, combined to make the con~ission's deliberations 
unnecessarily lengthy and cast Welles in the role of chief arbitor 
and prime motivator for the commission. 
Events through 1921 show that Welles and the State Department 
miscalculated the ability of the Hilitary Governor to cooperate with 
the commission in formulating a plan of wi thdrmval. For legal and 
practical reasons, the commission's work and ideas were subject to 
the Military Governor's approval. The Military Governor, although he 
lacked the constitutional authority, v-ras the de facto chief executive 
and promulgator of la>vs. In carrying out his mission, he considered 
himself responsible for insuring the attainment of United States 
policy objectives. Because of this, he placed more emphasis on 
Dominican acquiescence to what the United States considered neces-
sary than on United States cooperation with the Dominicans. The 
distinction is significant because it explains Robinson's approach 
to his dealings >vi th the commission. Robinson believed that the 
Dominican Republic was not yet ready for withdrawal of American forces. 
Faced with the reality of what he viewed as a premature withdrawal, 
Robinson attempted to form a commission which would have agreed with 
what he considered necessary to the Republic's stability and future 
welfare. Welles objected to Robinson's efforts and resolved to form 
a commission of his own design. When it became evident that Robinson 
was incapable of cooperating with this commission or of permitting 
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the commission to perform the role envisioned for it, Welles sup-
planted him. With this change the negotiations entered a new phase. 
Under Welles' tutelage and prodding, the commission performed its 
role we11. 10 Welles did not dictate to the commission. He made clear 
the objectives of United States policy and convinced the co~~ission 
members that the objectives were compatible with the interests of the 
Dominican Republic. Within this framework, the commission was able 
to formulate a plan of Hithdrawal and write legislation which they 
believed provided for Dominican sovereignty and independence. The 
best example of Welles' cooperative attitude is·the solution to the 
constabulary problem. Helles and the commission agreed on the need 
for a professional, apolitical constabulary. The problem was that 
officer training had been neglected, and it would take time to correct 
this deficiency. Welles was aware that the co~~ission could not 
agree to American control over the constabulary, and he did not press 
for this. Instead, he quietly convinced the military government to 
accelerate the training program while he and the commission attended 
to other matters. Hhen it came time for the constabulary to assume 
responsibility for law and order, the settled condition of the island 
permitted Welles to agree to Dominican suggestions for the constabu-
lary's control and organization. 
Welles' concept of friendly cooperation was also illsutrated in 
other ways. At no time did Welles involve himself, or allow himself 
to be involved, in internal Dominican politics. The commission 
members represented the full range of Dominican politics, except for 
the nacionalis tas_, who declined to participate. The practical task 
which confronted Welles was to maintain the political balance of the 
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commission, and eventually of the provisional government. Welles' 
success in maintaining the political balance was accomplished with-
out secret manueverings or arrangements. He dealt with each of the 
potential candidates openly and fairly, suspending judgement and 
• . . ·h' b. . . 11 ma~nta1.n~ng ~s o Ject~v~ty. In so doing, he forced the Dominicans 
to recognize that they would have to learn to settle their own 
political differences rather than look to the United States. 
The members of the commission recognized that Welles \vas not 
attempting to manipulate them~ and this earned him their respect. 12 
This respect was strengthened by the ways in which Welles displayed 
his willingness to cooperate with the commission to accomplish the 
necessary tasks. There is no doubt that the commission members were 
as equally committed as Welles to ending the occupation, even if 
they did allow partisan politics to divert their attention from this 
goal. When these diversions occurred, Welles reacted calmly and 
with patient understanding. He reminded the commission members of 
their responsibilities and commitments and of the risks inherent in 
their actions. The commission reacted by returning to their tasks 
with a minimum of discord. 
The kind of diplomacy Sumner Welles carried out in the Dominican 
Republic is most correctly characterized as personal diplomacy. His 
presence in the Dominican RepUblic and his deep involvement in the 
work of the commission was vital to the success of the withdrawal 
plan. Support for this contention is illustrated by the lack of 
progress toward an acceptable agreement between 1920 and 1922, and 
by the stagnation that occurred when Welles left the island for short 
periods between 1922 and 1924. Later observations about Welles 
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reflect upon his "cold" relations with his staff and his stilted way 
. 
of life. Nevertheless, he possessed a strong personality that struck 
a responsive chord with the members of the commission. A genuine 
friendliness which transcended official requirements developed between 
Welles and the Dominican leaders. This personal friendship extended 
into the eight years that Welles was absent from the State Department. 
Welles' idea of a foreign policy based upon friendly cooperation, 
however~ did not require the development of strong personal attach-
ments. An effective policy toward the Latin American nations, accord-
ing to Welles, would consist of practical agreements designed to attack 
the causes of instability. Yne only agreement of this nature 
provided for in the plan of withdrawal was continuation of the customs 
receivership. The receivership produced ample revenues for the 
Dominican Republic and a few years of relative prosperity. 
Before Welles left the State Department, Secretary of State Frank 
B. Kellogg approved suggestions which Hould have offered the Dominicans 
agricultural assistance and aid in reorganizing their treasury. 
These proposals were intended to improve the Dominican Republic 1 s 
commercial development. Welles considered commercial development 
and trade relations as key elements in friendly hemispheric relations. 
He dismissed any idea of a United States trade monopoly or selfish 
exploitation, believing such actions counter to friendly cooperation. 
Instead, he sought removal of tariff barriers and expansion of trade 
relations be tween all nations of the hemisphere. In 19 24, \velles 
wrote: 
It is most axiomatic that development of commercial 
relations between countries brings about a better 
understanding and a clearer perception of their 
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advantages and com.rnon nee.ds.l3 
Four years later, Welles summed up his view on what the United States 
policy toward Latin America should be in these words: 
It is in the stimulation of commercial ties, in the 
facilitation of educational advantages to students 
from the southern Republics, in the limitation of 
financing to productive purposes, in the proffer of 
technical and expert assistance when it may be needed, 
that the United States will obtain the results desired, 
and not through military occupation, militarK inter-
vention, or armed supervision of elections.l 
For Sumner Welles and the United States, the Dominican Republic was a 
start in the correct direction. 
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